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DETERRENCE AND DAMAGES:
THE MULTIPLIER PRINCIPLE
AND ITS ALTER NATIVES
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One purpose of fines and damage awards is to deter harmful
behavior.

When

enforcement

is

imperfect,

however,

so

the

probability that any given violation will be punished is less than

100%,

the law's deterrent effect is usually thought to be reduced.

Thus, it is often said that the ideal penalty (insofar as deterrence is
concerned) equals the harm caused by the violation multiplied by
one over the probability of punishment. For example,

if a violation

faces only a 25% (or one-in-four) chance of being punished, on this
view the optimal penalty would be four times the harm caused by
the violation.
This prescription, which I will call the "multiplier principle," has
a long pedigree.1

It figures prominently in texts on law and
economics,2 and has been discussed in many scholarly works.3
Indeed, in the law review literature the multiplier principle is now
routinely cited as part of standard deterrence theory.4 The
1. In modem economics, the multiplier principle owes much of its prominence to Gary S.
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL. EcoN. 169 (1968). An
early version of the multiplier principle can be found in CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND
PuNISHMENTS 46 (David Young ed., 1986) (1766), and more explicitly in JEREMY BENTHAM,
A THEORY OF LEGISLATION 325-26 (R. Hildreth trans., London, Triibner & Co. 1864) (1802).
For a further discussion of these historical roots, see Keith N. Hylton, Punitive Damages and
the Economic Theory of Penalties, 87 GEO. L.J. 421, 425-27 (1998).
2. See, e.g., ROBERT CooTER & THOMA S ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 390-95 (1988); A.
MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 77-78 (2d ed. 1989);
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 7.1, at 241 (5th ed. 1998).
3. The most recent and most comprehensive of these is A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REv. 869 (1998). Earlier
analyses, in addition to the textbooks cited supra note 2, include WILLIAM M. LANDES &
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 160 (1987); Bruce
Chapman & Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages: Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40
ALA L. REv. 741, 808-19 (1989); Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When
and How Much?, 40 ALA L. REv. 1143, 1149·61 (1989); and Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and
Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 25-26 (1982).
4. Examples published in just the last two years include Tom Baker, Reconsidering
Insurance for Punitive Damages, 1998 WIS. L. REv. 101, 106-07; Roger D. Blair & Thomas F.
Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Damage Rules in Intellectual Property Law, 39 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 1585, 1619-20 (1998); David Crump, Evidence, Economics, and Ethics: What
Information Should Jurors Be Given to Determine the Amount ofa Punitive-Damage Award?,
57 Mo. L. REv. 174, 187 nn.82-83 {1998); Antony W. Dnes & Jonathan S. Seaton, An
Exploration of the Tort-Criminal Boundary Using Manslaughter and Negligence Cases, 17
INTI- REv. L. & EcoN. 537, 539 (1997); C. Douglas Floyd, Antitrust Victims Without Antitrust
Remedies: The Narrowing of Standing in Private Antitrust Actions, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1, 5
(1997); Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts" as Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 289, 315 & nn.115-16 (1998); Dale A. Nance, Guidance Rules and
Enforcement Rules: A Better View of the Cathedral, 83 VA. L. REv. 837 app. at 934 (1997);
Paul H. Rubin et al., BMW v. Gore: Mitigating the Punitive Economics ofPunitive Damages,
5 SUP. CT. EcoN. REv. 179, 186 (1997); John K. Setear, Responses to Breach ofa Treaty and
Rationalist International Relations Theory: The Rules ofRelease and Remediation in the Law
of Treaties and the Law of State Responsibility, 83 VA. L. REv. 1, 81-86 (1997); Cass R.
Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law),
.

.
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multiplier principle has also begun to be recognized by courts especially by economically sophisticated judges - as a possible
rationale for punitive damages.s
What is less widely appreciated, however, is that the multiplier
principle is almost never necessary to achieving optimal deterrence.
Even when the probability of punishment is less than 100%, more
recent work in law and economics has identified several other
remedies that could also achieve optimal deterrence.6 These
alternative remedies are often significantly less than those called for
by the multiplier principle. In some cases, the alternative remedies
could even be less than the harm caused by the violation, implying
that optimal deterrence could be achieved
reduced.

if

damages were

My principal aims in this article are to explain why the
multiplier principle is not necessary for optimal deterrence and to
begin a discussion of the alternatives.

While the mathematical

analysis behind the recent work is often quite technical, the basic
principles are not hard to grasp, and they can be illustrated with
simple numerical examples. Thus, a secondary aim is to familiarize
a larger audience with the conclusions of this technical body of
work.

Since this work identifies alternatives to the multiplier

principle, its significance is potentially as broad as that of the
multiplier principle itself.
Part I begins by reviewing how optimal deterrence is achieved
by what I will call the "traditional multiplier principle," in which the
harm caused by a defendant's offense is multiplied by one over the
probability of punishment. When the probability of punishment is
the same no matter how badly a defendant has behaved, such a
multiplier is relatively easy to administer. In most contexts in which
enforcement is imperfect, however, the probability of punishment
any particular defendant faces depends in part on the nature of his
or her violation. That is, in most legal regimes, defendants who
commit only marginal offenses are less likely to be punished than
those who commit more serious or egregious ones. Whenever this
is the case, Part I shows that the traditional multiplier principle can
107 YALE L.J. 2071, 2082-84 (1998); and W. Kip VIScusi, The Social Costs of Punitive
Damages Against Corporations in Environmental and Safety Torts, 87 GEo. L.J. 285, 312-13
(1998).
5. See, e.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 592-94 (1996) (Breyer, J.,
concurring); Kemezy v. Peters, 79 F.3d 33, 35 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, CJ.); Zaro Designs v.
L'Oreal, S.A., 979 F.2d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J.); FDIC v. W.R. Grace &
Co., 877 F.2d 614, 623 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.).
6. I discuss this work infra in Part II.
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only if the multiplier is

so that the multiplier varies with

each defendant's probability of punishment.
Significantly, few legal regimes follow the traditional multiplier
in this respect, for few

(if any)

use multipliers that are calculated

case-by-case. Often no multiplier is used and only compensatory
damages are awarded, as in most civil suits under the common law.
When the law does use a multiplier, it is often set at a single value
that is the same for all defendants, as in the treble damage rule of
antitrust law.7 And when criminal or administrative penalties are
used, it is common to set a single fine for all violations of a certain
type (e.g.,

$100 for failing to stop at a stop sign), regardless of either

the harm caused or the probability of punishment. Obviously, none
of these systems of punishment satisfies the traditional, case-by
case multiplier principle.
The fact that real legal systems usually use some alternative to a
case-by-case multiplier raises two questions for those interested in
deterrence.

First, when

(if

ever) might these alternatives be

superior to the case-by-case multiplier? Second, whether or not
they are superior, at what level should the fines or penalties be set
(under each of these alternatives) to get the best deterrence
possible? A naYve view might hold that when the law uses one of
the alternatives, the best policy would still set the fine or other
penalty

as close as possible

to the level of the case-by-case

multiplier. But this nai'.ve view is incorrect, for - as recent work in
law and economics has also shown - each of these alternatives
requires a different level of penalties to achieve optimal deterrence.
Unfortunately, these differences are not widely understood in
mainstream legal analysis, which continues to be fixed on the more
traditional theory in which the multiplier is adjusted case by case.
Part II explores these differences by identifying the optimal
fines or damage awards8 under each of the possible alternatives. If
the law uses the same multiplier for all defendants, optimal
deterrence will usually require a penalty below the traditional
multiplier principle. If the law instead uses a single
defendants, as opposed to a single

multiplier,

fine

for all

the optimal fine could

be either above or below the level of the multiplier principle,
7. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994).
8. In most of the article, I will speak of fines and damage awards interchangeably,
without regard to whether they are paid to the victims (the usual rule for damages) or to the
state (the usual rule for fines). While there are of course important differences between each
of these penalties, most of those differences do not alter the resulting deterrent effect.
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depending on (among other things) how rapidly the probability of
punishment changes if a defendant commits a more or a less
egregious offense. Indeed, this last factor - the responsiveness of
the probability of punishment to changes in the egregiousness of an
offense - is an important determinant of the optimal penalty under
each of the alternatives discussed here. For this reason, Part III of
the article discusses the factors that could make the probability of
punishment more or less responsive to the degree of a defendant's
offense.
Finally, Part IV addresses the first question identified above, by
assessing the advantages and disadvantages of these alternatives
relative to a case-by-case multiplier. The alternatives clearly differ
in their computational complexity, and in the informational and
other demands they place on judges and juries (or on legislatures) .
They may also differ in other key respects, such as their effect on
litigation costs or on defendants' overall levels of activity, or on the
law's symbolic or expressive effects. In the end, I conclude that
remedies based on the traditional multiplier principle may well be
useful, and may even dominate the alternatives, in a fairly small set
of cases. In other cases, however, the balance of advantages and
disadvantages is harder to assess.
I.

THE TRADmoNAL MULTIPLIER PRINCIPLE

At the outset, it will help to distinguish between two ways of
achieving optimal deterrence: by adjusting the penalty, and by ad
justing the substantive legal standard. Suppose, for example, that
we wish to reduce the risk of leaks of toxic waste, and that the opti
mal level of precautions would reduce that risk to exactly 1 % . One
way to achieve this goal is to set a substantive legal standard under
which defendants are liable

if

but only

if

their risk exceeds that

level. If the substantive standard is set correctly, and

if

it can be

applied with no risk of error - two qualifications that will become
important below - it may not matter if the penalty for violating the
standard is set according to the multiplier principle. In such a re
gime, all that matters is that the penalty be large enough to deter
defendants from violating the substantive legal standard, so any
penalty set at this level

or higher will

achieve optimal deterrence.

Indeed, as long as defendants who comply with the substantive
standard can be assured of not paying any penalties at all, the pen
alty could (in theory) be increased to infinity without inducing
overdeterrence, because defendants could always avoid any penalty
by complying with the substantive standard. In such a regime,
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therefore, any increases in the penalty above the minimum level
needed to induce compliance with the standard would not affect the
behavior chosen by defendants.9

In most legal regimes, however, the size of the penalty will have
a continuous effect on defendants' behavior. For example, if the
law holds defendants strictly liable for

every

leak, it will then be

impossible for defendants to insulate themselves from liability sim
ply by complying with any substantive legal standard. The same is

true if there is no official rule of strict liability but if the substantive
standard is applied with some risk of error, so that even a defendant

whose leaks are within the officially permitted level still faces some
chance of being held liable.

As long as defendants face some

chance of being held liable, every increase in the penalty will
strengthen the incentive to reduce their number of leaks. At some
point, then,

if the penalty is set too high,

the incentive will grow too

strong and there will be too much deterrence. In short, optimal
deterrence in such a regime requires that the penalty be set at ex
actly the right level, not merely that it be at or above some
minimum.
My focus in this article is on regimes of the second type, for that
is where the multiplier principle is most relevant.10 Whenever de
fendants cannot avoid any chance of liability, the

pected

average

or

liability is what governs the deterrence incentives.

example,

if

ex
For

there is only one chance in four that they will actually

be found liable, defendants will discount the penalty by 25% in cal
culating how much they could save by reducing their leaks. This
discounting supplies the rationale for the multiplier principle, for it
seems to imply that deterrence will be reduced unless the penalty is
multiplied by four, to offset the

25%

probability of punishment.

However, this conclusion (that the law's deterrent effect will be
reduced without a multiplier) requires one additional assumption:
that the probability of punishment is unaltered by any changes in a
defendant's behavior. Subsection I.A below shows the role this as
sumption plays in the traditional analysis of multipliers. Subsection
I.B then relaxes this assumption, to show why the multiplier princi
ple is not necessary for optimal deterrence if the assumption is
invalid.
9. This point is developed at more length in Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84
CoLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1524-27 {1984). I will return to it infra in section 11.C.
10. The application of the multiplier principle (and of punitive damages generally) to
regimes of the first sort is discussed in Hylton, supra note �·

A.
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Assuming the Probability of Punishment Stays Constant

Suppose that a firm's activities pose a

1%

risk of leaking toxic

waste in a way that would cause $6 million worth of damages.11
The average or expected costs of this activity would thus be $60,000

(.01 x $6,000,000). Suppose, though, that the firm could alter its
operations to eliminate that risk and replace it with a 1% risk of a
less serious leak that would cause only $5 million in damages, thus
reducing the expected costs to

$50,000 (.01

x

$5,000,000).

This

means that the alteration would reduce the expected social costs of
this activity by

$10,000 ($60,000 - $50,000). The alteration is there
fore socially efficient if, but only if, its cost is less than $10,000.
If enforcement is perfect - that is, if the firm knows that it will
have to pay for all damages its leaks cause - then the firm's aver

$60,000 if it does not alter its operations and
$50,000 if it does. By altering its operations, the firm can thus save
$10,000 in expected liability ($60,000 - $50,000). Since $10,000 is
age liability will be

also the social benefit from the alteration, the firm's incentives will
be socially optimal. That is, the firm will have an incentive to make
the alteration if, but only if, the cost of doing so is less than

$10,000.

Now suppose that enforcement is instead imperfect, and that
even

if

there is a leak the firm faces only a

25%

chance of being

held liable. The firm might then reason as follows: "If we do not
alter our operations, then whenever there is a leak (i.e., in

1%

of

the cases) we will face a 25% probability of having to pay $6 million
in damages. This is equivalent to an expected liability of $15,000

(.01 x .25 x $6,000,000). If we instead alter our operations, we will
face a 25% chance of having to pay only $5 million, so our expected
liability will decline to $12,500 (.01 x .25 x $5,000,000). But this
shows that altering our operations would reduce our expected lia
bility by only

$2,500 ($15,000 - $12,5000)."

This provides too little

incentive for the firm to alter its operations, since the social gain
from the alteration would still be

$10,000

reasoning behind the multiplier principle:

(not $2,500). This is the
if the chance of having to

pay damages is only 25%, the firm will discount the expected penal

ties undesirably, and the incentive to improve its behavior will be
weakened.12
11. This example is similar to one used by Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 3, at 879-80.
Like them, I assume that all the relevant costs and benefits can be measured (or at least
approximated) numerically.
12. More precisely, the deterrent effect will be reduced if the firm believes that the
probability of punishment is only 25%: it is the firm's beliefs about the probability that
matter. In the discussion that follows, this qualification will be assumed. For a further dis-
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This example also shows that if the measure of damages were
multiplied by four, the firm's incentives would be optimal again. If
damages were multiplied by four, the firm would then have to pay
$24 million (4 x $6,000,000) if it caused a leak and had not altered
its operations, and would have to pay $20 million (4 x $5,000,000) if
it had altered its operations. This gives the firm an average or ex
pected liability of $60,000 without the alteration (.01 x .25 x
$24,000,000), compared to $50,000 with the alteration (.01 x .25 x
$20,000,000), so the alteration would reduce the firm's expected lia
bility by $10,000 ($60,000 - $50,000). A multiplier of four thus re
stores the equality between the private gain to the firm and the gain
to society at large. This is because a multiplier of four exactly com
pensates for the 25% chance of being held liable.
Examples such as this are what give the multiplier principle its
air of inevitability. Notice, though, that this example assumed that
the probability of punishment stayed fixed at 25% whether or not
the firm altered its operations. The firm's expected liability was cal
culated on the assumption that if it failed to make any alterations, it
faced a 25% probability of paying $24 million in damages; while if it
did make the alterations, it faced the same 25% probability of
paying $20 million in damages. In other words, the example as
sumed that the probability of having to pay damages stayed the
same regardless of the firm's actual behavior.
As noted earlier, more recent work in law and economics has
relaxed this assumption by considering legal regimes in which the
probability of punishment depends in part on how well the defend
ant has behaved.13 The following subsection explains the implicacussion of this aspect of deterrence theory, see Steven Garber, Product Liability, Punitive
Damages, Business Decisions and Economic Outcomes, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 237, 247-51.
13. The earliest analyses include CHARLES J. GoETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW
(1984); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW
93-99 (1987); John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965 (1984); and Richard Craswell & John E. Calfee,
Deterrence and Uncertain Legal Standards, 2 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 279 (1986). Other work will
be cited below where it is relevant.
Another (and much larger) line of literature addresses the fact that the probability of
punishment can also be altered by increased expenditures on detection and enforcement, or
by other improvements to the enforcement system as a whole. For examples of this literature
- a literature that also traces its origins to Becker, supra note 1
see A. Mitchell Polinsky
& Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoffbetween the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69
AM. EcoN. REv. 880 (1979); or Steven Shavell, Specific Versus General Enforcement ofLaw,
99 J. POI.. EcoN. 1088 (1991). My concern in this article, however, is with the extent to which
the probability of punishment varies with changes in an individual defendant's behavior. I
therefore will not address any policies that might alter the probability of punishment across
the board, while still leaving that probability unaffected by changes in an individual defend
ant's behavior.
AND ECONOMICS 299-303

-
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tions of this work, and shows why the multiplier principle may no
longer be necessary for optimal deterrence.
B.

Relaxing the Constant Probability Assumption

In many contexts, the probability of punishment declines if de
fendants reduce the riskiness of their behavior or if they behave
better along any other dimension. Some reasons for the lower
probability of punishment will be discussed in Part III - for exam
ple, the public authorities may be less likely to prosecute a firm that
appears to be making a good-faith effort to reduce the severity of
its leaks, or such a firm might be better able to convince a court that
it has not violated the applicable legal standard. For now, the exact
reason for the reduced probability of punishment does not matter,
as long as the probability does in fact decline.
If the probability of punishment does decline when a defendant
improves its behavior, this produces two offsetting effects. The fact
that the probability of punishment is still less than 100% will
weaken the law's deterrent effect, just as in the earlier example.
But

if the

probability of punishment falls even lower when the de

fendant improves its behavior, this will

strengthen

the law's deter

rent effect, because improved behavior will then bring an extra
"reward" in the form of a lower probability of punishment. And
since there is no logical connection between the size of these two
effects, it is possible for either one to outweigh the other, leading
either to a net weakening effect (and net underdeterrence) or a net
strengthening effect (net overdeterrence )

.

Indeed, it is even possi

ble for both effects to exactly offset, leaving deterrence at just the
optimal level.14
These possibilities can all be illustrated using the toxic waste ex
ample. Let us now suppose that the probability of punishment is

still 25% if the firm does not alter its operations, but only 10% if it
does. If no multiplier is used, the firm will still face an expected

$15,000 if it does not alter its operations (.01
$6,000,000), but if it does alter its operations its expected
will fall to $5,000 (.01 x .10 x $5,000,000). This means that

altering

its operations will reduce the firm's expected liability by

$10,000

liability of

($15,000 - $5,000).

But

$10,000 is

x

.25

x

liability

also the social gain from the al

teration, so the firm's private savings will once again equal the
social savings. In other words, even with imperfect enforcement
14. For a mathematical demonstration of all three possibilities, see Craswell & Calfee,
supra note 13, at 284 tbl.1.
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and no damage multiplier at all, it is still possible for the firm's in
centives to be optimal.
Of course, it is only by coincidence (or by careful selection of
the hypothetical numbers) that the firm's incentives would be ex
actly optimal. If extra precautions did not reduce the probability of
punishment quite as much, so that probability fell from
some figure above

10%,

would then be less than

25%

to

the firm's savings in expected liability

$10,000,

which would give the firm too

weak an incentive (net underdeterrence). Conversely, if the extra
precautions reduced the probability of punishment even more, to
some figure even less than

10%,

the firm's savings would then be

more than $10,000, and the firm would have too strong an incentive
(net overdeterrence ). The net effect on the firm's incentives thus
depends critically on the

rate

at which the probability of punish

ment falls as the firm improves its behavior. In economic terms, it
is the marginal change in the expected penalty, and not its absolute
level, that governs the firm's incentives.
C.

Adjusting the Multiplier Case-by-Case

Even when the multiplier principle is not strictly necessary for
optimal deterrence, it could still provide one way of achieving that

goal. To be sure, we just saw that if extra precautions reduced the
probability of punishment from

25%

to

10%,

then defendants

would have optimal incentives without any multiplier at all. In such
a case, it might seem that any multiplier would be a bad idea,
because it could only strengthen the deterrent effect and lead to
overdeterrence. However, this intuition must be discarded when
the probability of punishment is not a constant. In this section, I
show that optimal deterrence can still be achieved using the tradi
tional multiplier principle, but only if the multiplier is

arately for each defendant,

calculated sep

based on each defendant's actual

probability of punishment.
Consider again the example from the preceding subsection. In
that example, defendants who did not take extra precautions faced
a

25%

probability of punishment. If the multiplier is recalculated

case by case, these defendants will still be given a multiplier of four,
so they will still have to pay $24 million (4 x $6,000,000) if they are
found liable. Their average or expected liability will thus be

$60,000 (.01

x

.25

x

$24,000,000).

However,

take the extra precautions face only a

10%

if

defendants who do

probability of punish

ment, they would be assigned a multiplier of ten (if the multiplier is
recalculated case by case). These defendants will therefore have to

pay

2195
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$50 million (10 x $5,000,000) whenever they are found liable, so
$50,000 (.01 x .10 x $50,000,000).1s

their expected liability will be

This means that defendants' incentives will be optimal again, be
cause taking the extra precautions will reduce their expected liabil
ity by

$10,000 ($60,000 - $50,000),

which just equals the social gain

from those precautions.

In short, even when the multiplier principle is not absolutely

necessary for optimal deterrence, it may still be sufficient to achieve
that goal. As long as the probability of punishment (whether 25%
or 10%) is offset by just the right multiplier, the effect will be the
same as if enforcement were perfect, and defendants will be made
to feel the full costs of their behavior.

1.

Case-by-Case Multipliers as "Taxes" on Improvements

It is instructive to compare this conclusion with the one reached
in the preceding subsection, when optimal deterrence was achieved
even without any damage multiplier. In the preceding subsection,
we saw that the decline in the probability of punishment (from
to

10%)

25%

could itself be enough to create optimal incentives, thus

achieving optimal deterrence even though defendants paid only the
actual costs of their behavior

($6

million and

$5

million, respec

tively).16 Yet the example just discussed showed that optimal deter

rence could also be achieved if the penalties were increased through
a multiplier - and increased quite dramatically, to

$50

$24 million and

million respectively. But this might seem paradoxical: How

can a dramatic increase in penalties leave the law with the same
deterrent effect?
The explanation lies in the fact that, while a case-by-case multi
plier does increase penalties overall, it also introduces a new factor
that checks any tendency to overdeterrence. If the multiplier is re
calculated in every case, defendants who improve their behavior

will (in effect) be "taxed" on that improvement, by being subjected
to a larger multiplier

if and when

they are found liable. In the ex

ample just discussed, defendants who took extra precautions re
duced their probability of punishment (from
thereby

increased

25%

to

10%)

and

their multiplier (from four to ten). This tax, in

the form of a higher multiplier, counteracted what would otherwise

15. Notice that the penalty assessed against these defendants ($50 million) will be larger
than the penalty assessed against defendants who did not take the extra precautions ($24
million). The possibility that this relationship might offend notions of corrective justice will
be discussed infra in section IV.G.
16. See supra text following note 14.
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be an incentive for overdeterrence. As long as the multiplier is re
calculated whenever the probability of punishment declines, the net
effects should exactly offset and defendants should have just the
optimal incentives.17
Indeed, the same analysis would apply even if the original incen
tives (in the absence of any multiplier) had favored overdeterrence.
For example,

if taking extra precautions reduced

the probability of

punishment from 25% to less than 10%, the reward for taking those
precautions would then be even greater (in the absence of a multi
plier), leading to too much deterrence. But

if a

multiplier is used,

and if the multiplier is calculated separately for each defendant, de
fendants who take extra precautions would then face an even
higher tax, for their new multiplier would be even greater than ten
(because their probability of punishment would be less than
Paradoxical as it may seem,

duce the

increasing penalties

10%).
re

can sometimes

law's deterrent effect, as long as the extent of the increase

itself responds (through changes in the multiplier) to each change in
a defendant's behavior.

2.

The Effect of a Constant Multiplier

The preceding analysis also shows why the multiplier, to have
this effect,

must

be recalculated in every case, so that it changes

with each defendant's actual behavior. If the multiplier is instead
fixed at some constant level, it no longer leads to optimal
deterrence.
The toxic waste example can illustrate this point as well. In that
example, the average probability of punishment was somewhere
between

10% and 25%.

Suppose, for the sake of concreteness, that

20% (as would be the case if one-third of
all defendants took the extra precautions but two-thirds did not). If
the damage multiplier were set at a constant based on this average
probability of punishment, all defendants would be given a multi
plier of five. This means that defendants who did not take extra
precautions would have to pay $30 million in damages (5 x
$6,000,000) each time they were caught, while defendants who did
take extra precautions would have to pay only $25 million in dam
ages (5 x $5,000,000).
this average was exactly

Unfortunately, these penalties will create too much deterrence.
Defendants who do not take extra precautions will now face ex
pected liabilities of

$75,000 (.01 x .25 x $30,000,000), while

defend-

17. For a mathematical proof, see Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13, at 292 n.18.
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ants who do take extra precautions will face expected liabilities of
$25,000 (.01 x .10 x $25,000,000). Thus, defendants who take the
extra precautions will be rewarded with a $50,000 reduction in their
expected liability ($75,000 - $25,000). But the true social savings
from these precautions are still only $10,000 ($60,000 - $50,000), so
this $50,000 reward is too large and will lead to overdeterrence.
Notice, too, that the problem is not just that a constant multi
plier will not be sufficiently fine-tuned, in the sense that any con
stant will be too high for some defendants and too low for others.18
To the contrary, overdeterrence can still be a problem even if the
constant multiplier is set at a level that is not "too high" (according
to the traditional principle) for any individual defendant. In the
example just considered, the highest probability of punishment was
25%, for defendants who did not take the extra precautions. If we
follow the traditional multiplier analysis, a multiplier of four would
be just right for those defendants and too low for all others (those
for whom the probability of punishment was only 10%). And if a
multiplier of four is just right for some and too low for others, it
might seem as though that multiplier would have to yield too little
deterrence on balance.
In fact, though, a multiplier of four will still produce too much
deterrence if it is applied as a constant. With a constant multiplier
of four, defendants who do not take the precautions will have to
pay $24 million in damages (4 x $6,000,000) each time they are
caught, while defendants who do take the precautions will have to
pay $20 million (4 x $5,000,000). This means that defendants who
do not take the precautions now face an expected liability of
$60,000 (.01 x .25 x $24,000,000), while defendants who do take the
precautions face an expected liability of $20,000 (.01 x .10 x
$20,000,000). As a result, defendants can now save $40,000 in ex
pected liability ($60,000 - $20,000) by taking the precautions, and
this is still far more than the $10,000 social value of the precautions.
Thus, a constant multiplier can still lead to overdeterrence even
when it seems "just right" for some defendants (according to the
traditional multiplier principle) and "too low" for all others.
While this conclusion, too, may seem paradoxical, it follows di
rectly from the earlier analysis. The reason is that constant multi
pliers - even ones set at relatively low levels - eliminate the "tax"
referred to earlier. As we have seen, a case-by-case multiplier taxes
18. Polinsky and Shaven emphasize this objection to constant multipliers. See Polinsky &
Shaven, supra note 3, at 893.
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defendants whose behavior improves by giving them a higher multi
plier (to correspond to their lower probability of punishment). A
constant multiplier eliminates this "tax," but it still increases the
overall deterrent effect by increasing all penalties across the board.
By thus increasing the size of all penalties without any offsetting
"tax," constant multipliers can easily produce too much deterrence,
just as in the example above. In fact, to achieve the optimal level of
deterrence a constant multiplier will usually have to be set

below

the traditional multiplier principle (as the following Part will
discuss).

I!.

ALTERNATIVE ROUTES TO OPTIMAL DETERRENCE

As noted in the introduction,19 most legal systems do not use
multipliers that are calculated case by case. Instead, they use multi
pliers set at the same level for all defendants, or fines set at the
same level for all defendants, or compensatory damages with no
multipliers at all. Accordingly, it is important to understand how
penalties should be set to achieve optimal deterrence under each of
these alternative approaches - and how those penalties would dif
fer from the more familiar, case-by-case multiplier principle.

In this Part, I show that constant multipliers can achieve optimal
if they are set at some suitably lower level (lower, that

deterrence

is, than the traditional multiplier principle). Constant fines can also
achieve optimal deterrence, usually by being set below the tradi
tional multiplier principle, but sometimes by being set above that
level. Optimal deterrence might also be achieved by reforms that
do not involve any multiplier at all - for example, by caps on the
highest possible damage awards, or by changing the substantive
legal standard. Thus, while the traditional multiplier principle may
perhaps be

sufficient

for optimal deterrence, it is not at all

necessary.
A.

The Optimal Constant Multiplier

The toxic waste example has already shown how a constant mul
tiplier set at

1.0 could

still achieve optimal deterrence. In that ex

ample, extra precautions reduced the probability of punishment
from

25%

to

10%,

and that effect by itself was enough to reduce

defendants' expected liability by

$10,000.20

Since

$10,000 was

also

the social benefit produced by the extra precautions, this meant
19. See supra text accompanying note 7.
20. See supra text following note 14.
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that defendants had the optimal incentives even with no multiplier
at all. But using no multiplier at all, and merely awarding compen
satory damages, is equivalent to multiplying the damages by one in

every case. And if enforcement is imperfect, a multiplier of one will

be below the level recommended by the traditional multiplier prin

ciple, which in this example would have been between four and ten
(because the probability of punishment ranged from

25% to 10%).

In short, we have already seen one example where optimal deter
rence was achieved using a constant multiplier below the optimal
case-by-case multiplier.
Of course, there is no reason to think that the optimal constant
multiplier will always equal one. Indeed,

if we change the example

slightly, so extra precautions reduce the probability of punishment
from

25% to only 20%, the constant multiplier will then have to be

larger. In this revised example, defendants who take no extra pre
cautions will face expected

liability of

$15,000 (.01

x

.25

x

$6,000,000) if no multiplier is used, but defendants who do take the
$10,000 (.01 x .20 x
$5,000,000). Defendants who take the precautions will thus be re
warded with only a $5,000 reduction in expected liability ($15,000 $10,000), and this reward is less than the social value of the precau
tions, which is still $10,000 ($60,000 - $50,000). In this case, then,

precautions will face expected liability of

defendants will have too little incentive to take the extra precau
tions. To correct this problem, the multiplier must be greater than
one in order to magnify the reward for taking extra precautions. In
this example, the optimal constant multiplier happens to be exactly
two.21
To be sure, a constant multiplier of two is still less than the opti
mal

case-by-case

multiplier under the traditional multiplier princi

ple, for that multiplier would now be somewhere between four and
five (based on a probability of punishment ranging from

20%).

25%

to

In this new example, though, the optimal constant multiplier

is not as far below the lower end of this range as it was in the origi
nal example, where the optimal constant multiplier was only one.
This is because the new example features a probability of punish
ment that is less responsive to improvements in defendants' behav21. The full calculations are as follows. With a constant multiplier of two, defendants
who do not take extra precautions will have to pay $12 million when they are caught (2 x
$6,000,000), while defendants who do take extra precautions will have to pay $10 million (2 x
$5,000,000). This gives defendants an expected liability of $30,000 if they do not take precau
tions (.01 x .25 x $12,000,000), as compared to an expected liability of $20,000 (.01 x .20 x
$10,000,000) if they do take precautions. The savings in expected liability is therefore $10,000
($30,000 - $20,000), which again equals the social benefit from the precautions.
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ior: taking extra precautions in the new example brings just a slight
reduction in the probability of punishment, from

25% to 20%.

The

lesson here is that the rate at which the probability of punishment
declines is a key factor in determining how low a constant multi
plier should be.
Indeed,

if

·

the probability of punishment were to decline even

faster with each improvement in a defendant's behavior, the opti
mal constant multiplier would be even smaller - and could even be
less than one, implying that even compensatory damages would be
too high. To see this, let us alter the example so that extra precau
tions reduce the probability of punishment from
down to

5% .

25%

all the way

If no multiplier is used, defendants who do not take

the precautions would still face expected liabilities of

$15,000

Gust

as before), but defendants who do take the precautions would face
expected liabilities of

$5,000,000). This gives
$12,500 reduction in its
($15,000 - $2,500). But this $12,500 reward is
$2,500 (.01

x

.05

x

each defendant who takes the precautions a
expected liability

greater than the social value of those precautions (which is still

$10,000), so these penalties will lead to overdeterrence.

To dampen

defendants' incentives and achieve optimal deterrence, any con
stant multiplier would have to be set at some value less than one.

In this example, the optimal constant multiplier happens to be 0.80,
which is equivalent to holding defendants liable for only 80% of the
harm caused by their behavior. Even though defendants are clearly
paying less than the full social costs of their behavior, their incen
tives are still socially optimal.22
Of course, a multiplier of

0.80 is much

less than the traditional

case-by-case multiplier, which in this example would be somewhere
between four and twenty (based on probabilities of punishment
between

25%

and

5%). In

general, the more the probability of

punishment declines with any improvement in a defendant's behav
ior, the greater will be the divergence between the optimal constant
multiplier and the optimal case-by-case multiplier. As long as the
probability of punishment declines at all, though, the optimal con
stant multiplier will almost always be less than the optimal case-by
case multiplier. More precisely, the optimal constant multiplier will
22. With a constant multiplier of 0.80, defendants who do not take extra precautions will
have to pay only $4.8 million each time they are caught (.80 x $6,000,000), while defendants
who do take extra precautions will have to pay $4 million (.80 x $5,000,000). This gives
defendants an expected liability of $12,000 if they do not take the extra precautions (.01 x .25
x $4,800,000), compared to an expected liability of only $2,000 (.01 x .05 x $4,000,000) if they
do take extra precautions. This makes the savings in expected liability again equal to $10,000
($12,000 - $2,000), which is still the social value of the extra precautions.
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never be greater than the optimal case-by-case multiplier, and will
usually be less.23
The reason for this follows from the analysis given earlier. We
have already seen that the traditional multiplier will create optimal
incentives if that multiplier is adjusted on a case-by-case basis to
reflect each improvement in a defendant's behavior. We have also
seen that this case-by-case adjustment operates as a kind of a tax,
which penalizes defendants whose behavior improves by making
them face a larger multiplier (to correspond to their reduced
probability of punishment). Making the multiplier a constant takes
away this tax on improvements and thus strengthens the incentives
to make such improvements. But

if

the case-by-case multiplier

(including the tax on improvements) had been creating exactly the
optimal incentives, any change that strengthens those incentives
will make them too strong, leading to net overdeterrence. The only
way to correct this problem (while still employing a constant multi
plier) is to reduce the size of the multiplier, reducing the deterrent
effect. This is why the optimal constant multiplier will usually be
less than, and can never be greater than, the optimal case-by-case
multiplier.
The size of the optimal constant multiplier will also depend on
the expected damage award facing a defendant whose behavior is at
or very near the socially optimal level.

In

the original toxic waste

example, defendants who took the socially efficient level of precau
tions expected that a leak would occur in 1% of all cases, and that
they would then face a

10% chance of having to pay damages of $5

million (before any multiplier was applied). This prospect left these
defendants facing an expected liability of

$5,000,000).

$50,000 (.01

x

.10

x

But if that figure were either higher or lower, the law's

deterrent effect would be altered, requiring a corresponding adjust
ment in the size of the constant multiplier.
To see this, let us change the original example to make the toxic
waste slightly more hazardous, so that a leak now causes

$8 million

$6 million) if no extra precautions are
$7 million in damages (rather than $5 million) if the de

in damages (rather than
taken, and

fendant does take extra precautions.

Since both figures have

increased by the same amount, the social efficiency of the precau
tions will be just what it was before: the precautions will still reduce

23.

For a mathematical proof, see Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13, at 297 & n.25.
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expected social costs by $10,000.24 However, this change in the ab
solute levels of harm reduces the optimal constant multiplier. In
the earlier example where the damage caused by a leak was either
$6 million or $5 million, and extra precautions reduced the
probability of punishment from 25% to only 20%, we saw that the
optimal constant multiplier was exactly two.25 If we use these same
probabilities in this new example, though, the optimal constant
multiplier falls to 1.67.26
The reason why the absolute size of the damages matter is that
this affects the significance (to the defendant) of the rate at which
the probability of punishment declines. In both of these examples,
the extra precautions reduced the probability of punishment by the
same amount, from 25% to 20%. In the first example, though, this
represented a reduction of five percentage points in the probability
of paying $6 or $7 million (before any multiplier was applied), while
in the second case it represented a reduction of five percentage
points in the probability of having to pay $7 or $8 million. Obvi
ously, the second reduction is more valuable to defendants than the
first, so the second offers stronger incentives for defendants to im
prove their behavior. As a result, any constant multiplier that was
optimal in the first case will be too strong in the second case, and
therefore will have to be reduced. This is just what happened in the
example itself: the optimal constant multiplier fell from 2.0 to 1.67.
This shows that the optimal level for a constant multiplier depends
both on the rate at which the probability of punishment declines
and on the absolute level of damages that are expected when de
fendants behave optimally.
Of course, the absolute level of these damages depends partly
on the technology of the defendant's activity - for example, what
kind of waste is involved, and just how toxic is it? But the level of
damages may also be affected by other legal rules, especially the
rules governing causation. For example, if a defendant who failed
24. In this new example, the expected social costs of the defendants' behavior are $80,000
(.01 x $8,000,000) if they do not take the extra precautions, and $70,000 (.01 x $7,000,000) if
they do. The social value of the extra precautions is therefore $10,000 ($80,000 - $70,000).
25. See supra text accompanying note 21.
26. With a constant multiplier of 1.67, defendants who do not take the extra precautions
will have to pay $13.33 million each time they are caught (1.67 x $8,000,000), while defend·
ants who do take the precautions will have to pay $11.67 million (1.6 x $7,000,000). This
gives defendants an expected liability of $33,333 if they do not take the precautions (.01 x .25
x $13,333,333), compared to an expected liability of $23,333 (.01 x .20 x $11,666,667) if they
do, so defendants can save $10,000 in expected liability by taking the precautions ($33,333 $23,333). This $10,000 savings exactly equals the precautions' social value, so defendants'
incentives will be socially optimal.

2203

The Multiplier Principle

June 1999]

to take the appropriate precautions can prove that the same leak

would have occurred even

if

all appropriate precautions had been

taken, and that the same victims would still have suffered $7 million
in damages (rather than the $8 million in damages they actually suf

fered), the rules of causation will sometimes reduce such a defend
ant's liability to only

$1

million, reflecting the

incremental

harm

attributable to its failure to take proper care.27 If damages are con

sistently reduced in this way, the optimal constant multiplier will be

larger, because a larger multiplier will be needed to achieve the
same deterrent effect. In this example, the optimal constant multi
plier would equal four.28 Of course, a multiplier of four would also

satisfy the traditional multiplier principle, based on a probability of

punishment of

25%.

This conclusion holds more generally: whenever a causation

rule of this sort is applied without error, the optimal constant multi
plier will always be just as great as (though no greater than) the

optimal case-by-case multiplier.29 If such a causation rule is per

fectly applied, a defendant who takes the socially optimal level of
care should never have to pay any damages at all. Such a defendant
will therefore be unconcerned with the probability that it might be
held liable, and will thus be unaffected by the rate at which that

probability might change if the defendant were to deviate slightly
from the socially efficient level of care. But if the deterrent effect

wiJ1

be the same regardless of the rate at which that probability

changes, this means that the deterrent effect will be the same as it

would have been in a world where the probability of punishment
did not change at all. And in a world where the probability of pun

ishment did not change at all, there would be no difference between
the optimal constant multiplier and the optimal case-by-case multi

plier, because in such a world no case-by-case adjustments would
ever be required. This is why a perfectly applied causation rule sup-

27. See sources cited infra note 30.
28. The full calculations are as follows. Defendants who do not take extra precautions
will be charged with incremental damages of $1 million, for the reasons discussed in the text.
A multiplier of four means that these defendants will have to pay $4 million each time they
are caught (4 x $1,000,000), leaving them with an expected liability of $10,000 (.01 x .25 x
$4,000,000). However, defendants who do take extra precautions will not be charged with
any losses at all (under this incremental damage rule), so their expected liability will be zero.
This means that defendants can save $10,000 in expected liability ($10,000 minus 0) by taking
the precautions - which is just what the socially optimal incentives require.
29. For mathematical analyses of this relationship, see Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13,
at 295-97; Marcel Kahan, Causation and Incentives to Take Care Under the Negligence Rule,
18 J. LEGAL Sruo. 427, 437-39 .(1989). For a more qualitative discussion, see Mark F . Grady,
Punitive Damages and State of Mind: A Positive Economic Theory, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1197,
1201-09 (1989).
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plies the limiting case in which there is no effective difference
between the optimal constant multiplier and the optimal case-by
case multiplier.
It should be stressed, however, that this is indeed a limiting case.
If the causation rule is not applied perfectly, but instead involves
any risk of error, then even defendants who take socially efficient
precautions will always face at least some expected liability, so they
will care about the rate at which the probability of punishment
changes. More important, the rules of causation often are not ap
plied in precisely the way that the earlier example assumed.3° For
instance, if the efficient level of care would have led to a different
kind of accident, or to an accident whose losses would have fallen
on different victims, defendants' liability generally is not limited to
the incremental losses above and beyond those that would have
been imposed if they had taken the efficient level of care. The same
is true when the expected losses (at any level of care) are entirely
probabilistic, so the most that defendants can show is that a similar
accident might have happened even if they had taken the efficient
level of care. In such a case, defendants' liability usually is not re
duced by the statistical or expected value of the losses that might
have occurred even if they had behaved efficiently. Obviously,
there will also be no reduction of their liability in any regime of
strict liability, where defendants are held liable for the full costs
regardless of whether they behaved efficiently. And if (for any of
these reasons) defendants' liability is not limited to the purely
incremental losses, the optimal constant multiplier will then be less
than the multiplier principle. Often it will be less by a considerable
margin, as in most of the examples considered above.
To summarize, the optimal constant multiplier can never exceed
the optimal case-by-case multiplier, and only rarely will it equal
that level. Instead, in most cases the optimal constant multiplier
will be less than the optimal case-by-case multiplier, meaning that a
constant multiplier can achieve optimal levels of deterrence without
satisfying the multiplier principle. Moreover, the extent to which
the optimal constant multiplier falls below the multiplier principle
depends on two factors: (a) the rate at which the probability of
punishment falls with improvements in a defendant's behavior, and
(b) the absolute level of expected damages facing a defendant who
30. For discussions of the actual legal rules, see Cooter, supra note 3; Grady, supra note
29; David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vi·
sion ofthe Tort System, 97 HAR.v. L. REv. 849, 862-66 (1984). I discuss the deterrent effect of
other causation rules at more length infra in section 111.D.
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behaves in the socially optimal way. Only when one of these fac
tors is eliminated - that is, when the probability of punishment
never changes at all, or when defendants who behave optimally can
be assured of paying no damages - only then will the optimal con
stant multiplier be the same as the optimal case-by-case multiplier.
B.

The Optimal Constant Fine

Another route to optimal deterrence involves the use of a con
stant fine, in which every defendant who is found liable pays the
same total amount. For example, traffic laws often impose the same
fine for every violation of a certain type, regardless of the actual
damage caused by the violation. A constant fine is slightly different

from the constant multiplier discussed in the preceding section, for
a constant multiplier allows the total penalty (the multiplier times
the harm caused) to vary from defendant to defendant. By con
trast, a constant fine keeps the total penalty the same for all
defendants.
The significance of this distinction is that a constant multiplier
gives defendants two reasons to improve their behavior, while a
constant fine gives them only one. Under a constant multiplier, de
fendants who improve their behavior will be rewarded with a lower
probability of being punished, as emphasized in the preceding sec
tions of this article. But defendants who improve their behavior
will also be rewarded with a reduction in the damages to which any
multiplier will be applied, because improved behavior should

(if it

is truly an "improvement") inflict lower social costs. Indeed, both
of these effects can be seen in the toxic waste example discussed
earlier, because in every example there were two reasons why de
fendants who took the extra precautions faced a lower expected lia
bility. Defendants who took extra precautions benefited from a
reduction in the probability of punishment, from

25%

to some

lower value; but they also benefited from a reduction in the social
losses to which any multiplier would be applied, from
down to

$6 million
$5 million (or from $8 million down to $7 million, depend

ing on the example).
The key point for present purposes is that a constant fine elimi
nates the second of these effects. If the law uses a constant fine,
defendants who improve their behavior may still be rewarded with
a reduction in the probability of being penalized at all, but this will
be their

only

reward: the amount they will have to pay

if they are

penalized will stay constant. It follows that the deterrent effects of
a constant fine will always be less than the deterrent effects of an
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equivalent constant multiplier. To offset this reduction in deterrent
effect, the optimal constant fi ne will have to be larger than the opti
mal constant multiplier.31
This conclusion, too, is easy to see using a concrete example. In

if extra precau
tions reduced the probability of punishment from 25% to only 20%,
the toxic waste scenario, we calculated earlier that

the optimal constant multiplier would be exactly two.32 U sing such
a multipl ier, defendants who do not take the extra precautions will
have to pay $12 million each time they are caught

(2 x $6,000,000),
$10

while defe ndants who do take the precautions will have to pay
million

If the legal system instead uses a constant

(2 x $5,000,000).

fi ne, however, optimal deterrence will be achieved only if the fi ne is
set at

$20

million.33 Obviously, this

$20

million fi ne is larger than

the $12 million and $10 million penalties that would have been opti
mal under a constant multiplier regime.
At the same time, a

$20 million fi ne

is below the penalty called

for by the traditional multipl ier principle.

In

this example, defend

ants who do not take extra precautions still face a

25%

probability

of punishment, so the traditional multipl ier principle would require
a multiplier of fo ur, resulting in a total penalty of $24 million (4 x

$6,000,000).

Similarly, defendants who do take the extra precau

tions face only a

20%

probability of punishment in this example, so

for these defendants the multiplier principle requires a multiplier of
five and a total penalty of $25 million

(5 x $5,000,000).

As we have

seen, the optimal constant fi ne is only $20 mil lion, which is less than
either

$24

million or

$25

million.

However, the optimal constant fi ne may not always be less than
the optimal case- by-case multiplier. The optimal constant fine will
always be greater than the optimal constant multiplier, and the opti
mal

case-by-case

multiplier will also be greater than (or equal to)

the optimal constant multipl ier. However, the relationship between
the optimal constant fi ne and the optimal case-by-case multiplier is
more difficult to characterize. The most that can be said is that the
optimal constant fine will be less than the optimal case-by-case mul31. For a mathematical proof, compare Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13, at 294 (deriving
the value of the optimal constant multiplier) with id. at 297 (deriving the value of the optimal
constant fine).
32. See supra text accompanying note 21.
33. With a constant fine set at $20 million, defendants will face an expected liability of
$50,000 (.01 x .25 x $20,000,000) if they do not take the extra precautions, but an expected
liability of only $40,000 (.01 x .20 x $20,000,000) if they do take the extra precautions. The
savings in expected liability therefore equals $10,000 ($50,000 - $40,000), which is also the
social value of the extra precautions.
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tiplier whenever the probability of punishment is relatively respon
sive to improvements in a defendant's behavior.

In particular, if the

probability of punishment declines quite rapidly with each improve
ment in a defendant's behavior - so much that the defendant's
incentives would be optimal, or not too suboptimal, with no multi
plier at all - then the optimal constant fine will always be less than
the optimal case-by-case multiplier.34 But

if the probability of pun

ishment is somewhat less responsive to improvements in a defend
ant's behavior, the deterrent effect of a constant fine will then be
reduced, which means that the absolute level of the fine will have to

be raised in order to keep deterrence optimal. At some point, if the
probability of punishment is extremely unresponsive to improve
ments in a defendant's behavior, the optimal constant fine could
even surpass the optimal case-by-case multiplier.

In

short, the

rate

at which the probability of punishment responds is again a key vari
able - in this case, the variable that determines the size of the
optimal fine.

C.

Adjustments to the Substantive Standard

Another method of achieving optimal deterrence, at least under
some legal regimes, is to raise or lower the substantive threshold for
liability.35 For example, suppose that the optimal risk of toxic leaks
is exactly

1%

-

but suppose that the net incentives with no multi

plier at all favor underdeterrence, so firms choose instead to permit
a

1.5% risk.

One way of correcting this underdeterrence is to make

the substantive standard more strict, to permit no more than (say) a

0.75%

risk of toxic leaks. At this lower substantive standard, any

firm that continued to permit a

1.5% risk

would now face a higher

probability of detection and/or conviction, as its behavior would
more obviously violate the new substantive standard. This increase
in the probability of detection or conviction would give firms a
stronger reason to reduce their levels of risk, thus increasing the
law's deterrent effect and moving firms back toward the socially
optimal risk of
34.

1%.

If firms still permitted a risk of more than

1% ,

A mathematical proof is available from the author upon request

35. The possibility of changing the substantive standard to adjust for imperfect enforce
ment is discussed in Calfee & Craswell, supra note 13, at 997-99; and in Jason S. Johnston,
Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1385
(1987) [hereinafter Johnston, Punitive Liability]. Note, too, that the substantive standard
could also be raised or lowered indirectly by (for example) changing the evidentiary rules or
the burdens of proof. For discussions of this approach, see Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13,
at 290-92; Jason S. Johnston, Bayesian Fact-Finding and Efficiency: Toward an Economic
Theory of Liability Under Uncertainty, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 137 (1987).
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then the substantive standard could be lowered even further, until
the resulting probability of punishment gave defendants an incen
tive to choose exactly the
Of course,

if

1% level.

the net incentives without any multiplier instead

favored overdeterrence, the appropriate response would require re
laxing rather than tightening the substantive standard. Either way,
though, we could still achieve optimal deterrence without satisfying
the traditional multiplier principle. That is, there should be some
adjustment to the substantive legal standard that can achieve opti

if the probability of punishment remains less
and even if the fines or damage awards remain at purely

mal deterrence even
than one,

compensatory levels (and thus fail to satisfy the traditional multi
plier principle). This shows, again, that satisfaction of the multiplier
principle is not always necessary for optimal deterrence.

In addition, if the substantive standard were relaxed sufficiently,
above the
multiplier principle. This can be achieved if the substantive stan
optimal deterrence might also be achieved with penalties

dard is defined in such a way that it could never be applied, even
through judicial error, to a defendant who had behaved efficiently.
Penalties of this sort - referred to by Robert Cooter as "sanc
tions"36 - thus require a triggering test such as "egregious behav
ior," "gross negligence" or "reckless disregard for human safety,"
to ensure that they are never applied to efficient behavior.37 If the
probability of the higher penalty is literally zero for any defendant
who behaves efficiently, there will be no danger of inducing too
many precautions, because a defendant who is already behaving ef
ficiently will (by hypothesis) face no risk of having to pay the higher
penalty. As further increases in the penalty should have no effect
on these defendants, the penalty could (in theory) be increased
indefinitely without deterring beyond the optimal level.38
Since this approach permits the imposition of penalties that are

larger

than the multiplier principle (rather than penalties that are

smaller, as under most of the other alternatives discussed here), it
36. See Cooter, supra note 9, passim. By contrast, penalties calculated according to the
multiplier principle are referred to by Cooter as "prices," because they achieve deterrence by
making defendants pay the full social costs of their behavior (no more, and no less) as the
"price" of that behavior. See id. at 1528.
37. Compare Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 905·08 (arguing that the reprehensibil·
ity of the defendant's conduct should be irrelevant when damages are calculated by the mul·
tiplier principle, because under the multiplier principle the only relevant factors are the
amount of the harm and the probability of punishment).
38.

See Cooter, supra note 9,

at 1524-27.
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raises distinct issues that I will not address further.39 Still, the possi
bility of optimal deterrence with even larger penalties does rein
force the general lesson of this article - i.e., that the multiplier
principle is sufficient but not necessary for optimal deterrence.

D.

Caps on Damages, and Other Possible Adjustments

Finally, optimal deterrence can also be achieved by leaving the
substantive standard unchanged, but starting with compensatory
damages and adding or subtracting (rather than multiplying) a con
stant amount to each award. The size of the optimal addition or
subtraction is harder to express mathematically,40 but its general
character depends on the same factors that characterize the optimal
constant multiplier. That is, whenever the optimal constant multi
plier would be greater than one (implying that compensatory dam
ages need to be increased), optimal deterrence can be achieved by

adding

some amount to each compensatory award.

Similarly,

whenever the optimal constant multiplier would be less than one,
optimal deterrence can be achieved by

subtracting

some amount

from each compensatory award. Either way, the size of the amount
to be added or subtracted will be greater or less depending on just
how much the optimal constant multiplier would have been greater
or lesser than one.
For a similar reason, optimal deterrence could also be achieved
by placing a cap on the maximum size of the award - a move that
several states have enacted or considered in recent years.41 Placing
a cap on the largest possible award is similar in many respects to
subtracting something from the
award. That is,

expected value of the damage
if defendants face uncertainty about how damages

will be measured (in addition to uncertainty about whether they
will be liable at all), an upper limit on the maximum possible award
will cut off the upper end of that distribution. This will reduce the
average award, thereby reducing the deterrent effect.
To be sure, these reductions would make little sense

if optimal

deterrence were being pursued by means of the traditional multi
plier principle. Under the traditional multiplier principle, we must
be prepared to increase damage awards to almost any level, espe39. For further discussions of this approach as it might apply to punitive damages, see
Hylton, supra note 1; and Johnston, Punitive Liability, supra note 35.
40. For a mathematical model, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel Rubinfeld, The Welfare
Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level ofLiability, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 151, 159-60, 163
app. {1988).
41. For citations to the various legislative proposals, see BMW of North America, Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 app. (1996) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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cially when the probability of punishment is relatively small (so that
the optimal case-by-case multiplier is large).

As Polinsky and

Shaven have recently argued, caps on the largest possible award
could interfere with this goal, leading to less than optimal
deterrence.42
If optimal deterrence is instead being pursued by some other

route, however, it is harder to condemn such caps a priori. For ex
ample, if the law instead aims to achieve optimal deterrence by ap
proximating the optimal constant multiplier, we have already seen
that this typically requires awards that are lower than those called
for by the traditional multiplier principle.43 Viewed with this goal
in mind, a cap on the highest possible awards could be seen as mov
ing the average or expected award in just the right direction. In
other words, a reform that seems obviously unsound from the
standpoint of one route to optimal deterrence could be perfectly
sound from the standpoint of another.
Of course, to say that caps on damage awards

could be justified

is not to say that any particular proposal is a good idea. Calculating
the exact size of the optimal adjustment will often be difficult, in
which case it may be hard to say whether any particular cap goes
too far or not far enough. Indeed, calculation problems arise under
each of the alternatives - as, of course, they arise to some extent
under the multiplier principle itself. These calculation problems,
and other issues surrounding the administration of each set of rem
edies, will be discussed below in Part IV.
For now, my point is simply that the existence of alternative
routes must first be recognized before we can even begin to con
sider which is easiest to calculate, or which is best on any other
grounds. If we instead assume that the traditional multiplier repre
sents the

only means

of achieving optimal deterrence - as much of

the legal literature implicitly assumes today - we will never reach
the question of which route is on balance superior, because only
one route will even be considered. This accounts for my goal in the
first two parts of this article: to show that the multiplier principle is
sufficient, but not necessary, for optimal deterrence.
Ill.

THE RESPONSIVENESS OF THE EXPECTED PUNISHMENT

Part IV will discuss the actual advantages and disadvantages of
the alternative routes to optimal deterrence. Before beginning that
42. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 900.
43. See supra section II.A.
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discussion, though, this Part will say more about just when (and
why) the expected punishment might respond to changes in a de
fendant's behavior. As we have already seen, the rate at which the
probability of punishment declines is a key factor in determining
just how much lower a constant multiplier or a constant fine should
be to achieve optimal deterrence. Thus, the responsiveness of the
probability of punishment will play a key role in the comparisons in
Part IV of this article.
To see how the expected punishment responds to changes in a
defendant's behavior, it will be helpful to isolate several compo
nents. Before a defendant can be punished, several events must
occur: (a) the defendant's offense must be detected by someone;
(b) a plaintiff, or a government prosecutor, must decide to file suit;
(c) the court, or some other adjudicative body, must find the de
fendant liable; and (d) the appropriate fine or measure of damages
must be assessed. Since all four events must occur before the de
fendant will be punished, the expected penalty depends on the com
bined probability of all four - that is, on the probability of
detection

times the probability of prosecution times the probability
times the expected fine or damage award.

of a finding of liability

Each of these component probabilities will be discussed below.
A.

The Probability of Detection

In some contexts, the probability of detecting any given offense
will be completely unresponsive to the defendant's behavior. For
example, whether a speeding violation is detected typically depends
entirely on whether a police officer is present. Moreover, the
probability of a police officer being present is normally unaffected
by how fast the driver drives, and thus is unresponsive to any im
provement in the driver's behavior.
probability of punishment depends

In such a case, where the

only

on the probability the

offense is detected, that probability will not respond to any im
provements in a defendant's behavior.44
In some cases, though, even the probability of detection may
respond to the seriousness of the defendant's behavior. For exam
ple,

if it is easy to

detect that toxic waste has been leaked but hard

to detect who was responsible for the leak, the investigating author
ities may spend more time tracking down large leaks than tracking
44. Interestingly, many analyses of the traditional multiplier principle assumed the only
reason for imperfect enforcement was a low probability of detection. This is clearly true of
the earliest writers such as Beccaria and Bentham, cited supra in note 1. It is also true of
most of the examples in the recent article by Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 3.
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down small ones. If so, then manufacturers who permit the risk of
large leaks will effectively face a higher probability of detection
than will manufacturers who take more precautions and whose
leaks are likely to be small.45 In that event, even the probability of
detection will respond to changes in a defendant's behavior.
More important, even when the probability of detection is unre
sponsive to the defendant's behavior, the final probability of pun
ishment will also depend on the probability of prosecution and
conviction.

As

the following

subsections

demonstrate,

these

probabilities are almost always responsive to changes in a defend
ant's behavior.
B.

1.

The Probability of Litigation

The Probability of Prosecution in Systems of
Public Enforcement

Public prosecutors have limited resources, so the probability
that a detected offense will be prosecuted is typically less than

100%.

While this will reduce the law's deterrent effect, the impor

tant point (for present purposes) is that the lower probability will
not normally be the same for all defendants, and thus will not be a

constant.

Prosecutors usually have discretion to decide which cases

they pursue, and they often try to concentrate their limited
prosecutorial resources on the most serious offenses. If so, defend
ants who improve their behavior will be rewarded with a lower
probability of prosecution.
Indeed, it is hard to imagine systems of public prosecution in
which this is not true. Police officers, for example, are more likely
to stop a speeder who is thirty miles per hour over the speed limit
than one who is only five miles per hour over; and pollution author
ities are more likely to seek penalties for a huge leak of toxic waste
than they are for a small one. Some of this responsiveness may be
because it will be easier to win a case against the larger offender
than against the marginal one, thus implicating the probability of
success at trial (to be discussed in the following subsection). But
even

if conviction were

certain, one would still expect prosecutors

to devote the most resources to prosecuting those defendants
45. On the other hand, manufacturers who permit large leaks (or commit other serious
offenses) may also take greater pains to try to conceal their offense, thereby reducing the
probability of punishment. For a formal model of this effect - but one assuming that the
probability of punishment does not also vary with the egregiousness of the defendant's
behavior, and considering deterrence only by means of a constant fine - see Arnn S. Malik,
Avoidance, Screening and Optimum Enforcement, 21 RANo J. EcoN. 341 (1990).
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whose violations were the most serious. In any system of public

enforcement, then, we should expect the probability of prosecution

to decline with improvements in a defendant's behavior. The exact

rate of the decline will depend on the extent of the prosecutorial

discretion, and on the political and other factors that influence how

that discretion is exercised.46

The Probability of Litigation Under Private Enforcement

2.

If enforcement instead depends on private lawsuits, there may

be no public-spirited reasons for plaintiffs to concentrate their ef
forts on the most serious offenses. There may, however, be private
motives for them to do so.

In particular, if the most serious offenses

are also the ones that cause the most damage to their victims, then

the victims of the most serious offenses will expect the largest dam
age awards.

All else equal, then, victims of the most serious

offenses will also be the ones most likely to find it worthwhile to

hire a lawyer and sue. If so, then the most serious offenders will
again face the highest probability of suit.47

Of course, some kinds of improvements may not have this ef

fect,

if

they reduce the probability of an accident but do not alter

the injury that results

if

an accident occurs.48 In that event, since

the improvements will not affect the amount that is likely to be re

coverable at trial, they also will not affect the probability of litiga
tion.

In

many cases, though, extra precautions

will

reduce the

injury likely to be caused by an accident, and thus will also reduce

the amount likely to be recoverable at trial. For example, driving at
a lower speed typically reduces the magnitude of any injuries likely

to be suffered, as well as reducing the likelihood of any accident at

all. Similarly, improvements in a manufacturer's system of quality

control often will reduce the average severity of any defects that
happen to slip through the system, as well as reducing the likeli

hood of any defect at all. Whenever improvements in a defendant's

46. This suggests that a fruitful line of research might investigate the extent to which,
under different systems of punishments, it would be optimal for prosecutors to try to make
the probability of litigation more or less responsive to changes in a defendant's behavior. I
am grateful to Howard Chang for this suggestion.
47. For a mathematical model of just such a system, see Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note
40. Tue same argument is also made in A. Mitchell Polinsky, Are Punitive Damages Really
Insignificant, Predictable, and Rational? A Comment on Eisenberg et al., 26 J. LEGAL STUD.
663, 675-76 (1997).
48. For a mathematical model employing this alternative assumption, see Keith N.
Hylton, The Influence of Litigation Costs on Deterrence Under Strict Liability and Under
Negligence, 10 INn.. REv. L. & EcoN. 161 (1991).
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care do reduce the damages victims will suffer, they should also re
duce the probability that any victim will bother to sue.
I should note that, when extra precautions do reduce the
probability that a victim will sue, there is an additional reason why
optimal penalties could depart from the traditional multiplier prin
ciple. My analysis so far has interpreted the socially efficient level
of precautions as the level that minimizes the total accident costs
plus the total cost of precautions. However, if litigation is costly
then it may be more plausible to define the efficient level of precau
tions as the level that minimizes the sum of accident costs, precau
tion costs, and litigation costs.49 If so, reducing the size of the
penalty may produce additional benefits by reducing the number of
suits that are filed, thus reducing total litigation costs. On the other
hand, if the reduced penalty led to fewer precautions and hence a
larger number of accidents, then the total number of suits might
actually rise (even if the probability that any given accident would
lead to a suit had declined). As a result, it is hard to say which way
penalties should be adjusted to optimize the effect on the total
amount of litigation.so
Nevertheless, even if the effect on the absolute level of litigation
is indeterminate, it remains true that the probability of litigation
facing any individual defendant will usually be somewhat respon
sive to that defendant's behavior. This is enough to give rise to all
of the effects analyzed in earlier sections of this article. That is, if
the probability of litigation is itself responsive to defendants'
behavior, then the overall probability of punishment will also be
responsive, because the probability of litigation is simply one com
ponent of the overall probability of punishment. And if the overall
probability of punishment is responsive to defendants' behavior,
then the optimal constant multiplier will again diverge from the op
timal case-by-case multiplier, and each of these will diverge from
the optimal fine (or the optimal adjustment in any substantive legal
standard). In other words, if the probability of litigation responds
to improvements in a defendant's behavior, satisfaction of the mul49. This is the goal assumed in id. at 164; and by Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 40.
For a discussion of these (and other) goals more generally, see Gumo CALABRESI, THE CosT
OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 26-33 (1970).
50. As Polinsky and Rubinfeld conclude, "(t]he optimal adjustment to compensatory
damages takes both of these considerations into account, and may be positive or negative."
Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 40, at 153. For a qualitatively similar analysis, see David D.
Friedman, An Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REv. 1125, 1133-34
(1989).
Litigation costs could also rise if the amount spent on each suit increased, even if the total
number of suits did not. This possibility will be discussed infra in section IV.F.
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tiplier principle will again be sufficient but not necessary for opti
mal deterrence.

C.

The Probability of Conviction

The effects just discussed will be even more pronounced

if im

provements in a defendant's behavior also affect the probability of
an adverse decision in any case in which a lawsuit has been filed.
For simplicity, I will refer to this as "the probability of conviction,"

though I intend it to include unfavorable decisions in both public
prosecutions and private damage actions (where "probability of a
finding of liability" would be a more appropriate but more cumber
some label). As the probability of conviction depends largely on
the underlying legal standard, I discuss legal regimes based on strict
liability separately from those based on negligence.

1.

The Probability of Conviction Under Strict Liability

If the legal regime is truly one of strict liability, the probability
of conviction may be unresponsive to a defendant's behavior. The
probability of conviction may not be

100%,

for even regimes of

"strict liability" usually require proof of certain elements (was the
defendant engaged in the activity? did that activity cause this plain
tiff's harm?), and the chance of judicial error on one of these ele
ments may leave defendants facing a probability of punishment
below

100%.

Still, as long as the chance of error is not correlated

with the defendant's level of care, or with the social desirability of
any other dimension of the defendant's behavior, the probability of
conviction will still be unresponsive to any

improvements in the de

fendant's behavior.51 If so, then any responsiveness in the overall
probability of punishment will have to come from other compo
nents of that probability, such as the probability of detection or the
probability of litigation.

2.

The Probability of Conviction Under Negligence

If the legal regime is based on negligence, though, a different

picture emerges. A "negligence" regime, as I use that term, is one
that conditions liability on whether the defendant conformed to
some legally determined standard of behavior. Under such a re

gime, the probability of conviction should be extremely responsive
to improvements in a defendant's behavior.
51. Some reasons why this probability might indeed be correlated with the social desira
bility of the defendant's behavior will be discussed infra in subsection III.D.
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Indeed, the standard economic analysis of negligence rules has
already recognized many of the points made in this article.52 The
earliest analyses focused on perfectly applied negligence rules, in
which defendants' liability depended solely on whether they had
complied with the legal standard of care. This meant that the
probability of punishment declined instantly and dramatically, from
100% all the way to 0%, as soon as defendants came into compli
ance with the legal standard. A perfectly functioning negligence re
gime is thus the most extreme case of the phenomenon of interest
here, for it yields a probability of punishment that is extremely re
sponsive to improvements in a defendant's behavior.
Significantly, analyses of perfect negligence standards have long
recognized that the expected measure of damages (if and when lia
bility is found) need not satisfy the traditional multiplier principle.53
To the contrary, if the probability of punishment falls instantane
ously to zero, there will usually be a broad range of fines or damage
awards that will suffice to induce compliance with the legal stan
dard. B ecause defendants who comply with such a standard are re
warded by having their liability eliminated entirely, they will have
an incentive to do so as long as the penalty (if they do not comply)
equals or exceeds the cost of complying, so any penalty at or above
that level should lead to optimal deterrence.54 In other words,
under a perfect negligence standard, satisfaction of the multiplier
principle clearly is sufficient but not necessary for optimal
deterrence.
Of course, most real-world negligence standards are not perfect,
and compliance with the standard will not change the probability of
conviction from 100% to zero. More realistically, even defendants
who comply with the standard might still be held liable through
legal error, though that risk will normally decline as they take more
care (i.e., as they take precautions well in excess of the legal stan
dard).55 On the other side of the line, even defendants who do not
comply will sometimes be exonerated through judicial error, though
52. For a nontechnical discussion, see Cooter, supra note 9, at 1526-27, 1538-39.
53.

See, e.g., id.

54. See id. Of course, compliance with the legal standard will produce socially optimal
deterrence only if the legal standard is set at the socially efficient level of care.
55. Note that if there were no error or uncertainty of this sort, then defendants would
always comply with the negligence standard and would never be found liable, so it would
never be worthwhile for plaintiffs to bring suit. In other words, a negligence system with
perfect compliance and no uncertainty or error is not a sustainable equilibrium. For mathe
matical analyses of this aspect of a negligence system, see Keith N. Hylton, Costly Litigation
and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6 J.L. EcoN. & 0RG. 433 (1990); Janusz A. Ordover,
Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents, 7 J. LEGAL Sruo. 243 (1978).
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this possibility will typically decline as they take .less care (i.e., as
they fall obviously short of the legal standard). In other words,

under most real-world negligence standards, defendants face a con
tinuously declining probability of conviction that varies with the
amount of care they actually take.
This continuously declining probability of punishment is pre
cisely what I have assumed throughout the body of this article.

That is, in this sort of regime defendants who improve their level of
precautions will see their probability of conviction fall from

25% to
20%, or 10%, or some other lower figure (depending on the rate of

legal error). Under such a regime, there will no longer be an entire
range of punishments that induce compliance with the optimal stan

dard of care, as there would have been under a perfect negligence

system. Instead, as we have already seen, there will only be

one

constant multiplier that will create the optimal incentives, just as

there will only be one constant fine that is optimal (and only one

optimal case-by-case multiplier). And since the optimal case-by
case multiplier will then diverge from the optimal constant multi

plier (as well as from the optimal constant fine), there will again be

more than one route to optimal deterrence.

It is important to remember, too, that "negligence" as it is used

here is a term of art that covers more than its usual legal meaning.

That is, in economic analyses of law, "negligence" is used to refer to

any regime in which defendants are legally liable for the harm they

cause if, but only if, some aspect of their behavior is judged by a
court to fall short of some socially desirable ievel.56 This term is

usually used to mark a contrast with regimes of "strict liability" (an

other term of art) in which defendants are legally liable without

regard to the social desirability of any dimension of their behavior,

so the probability of conviction is truly unresponsive to improve

ments in a defendant's behavior.

Under these definitions, many bodies of law - probably most

- are "negligence" regimes. For example, many pollution laws
hold defendants liable if (but only if) their pollution exceeds a le

gally permitted level.57 Similarly, the law of predatory pricing pro
hibits monopolists from cutting prices under certain circumstances,

if (but only if) the new prices fall below a legally permitted level.58
' 56. For a rigorous mathematical definition, see SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 8.
57. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. pts. 425-71 (1998) (EPA effluent guidelines and standards under
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1994) (penalties for violation of
same).
58. For an overview of the relevant legal standards, see Michael L. Denger & John A.
Herfort, Predatory Pricing Claims After Brooke Group, 62 ANrrrRuST L.J. 541 (1994).

2218

[Vol. 97:2185

Michigan Law Review

And the law of fraud holds defendants liable

if

(but only if) the

allegedly fraudulent statements would have been interpreted by a
"reasonable" listener as asserting a false claim, where the judge or
jury must decide whether any given statement violates that stan
dard (or whether the statement should instead have been dis
counted as mere "puffing").59 This makes each of these doctrines a
"negligence" regime, according to the economic definition of that
term.
Indeed, even legal doctrines described by courts as "strict liabil
ity" are sometimes negligence regimes for purposes of this defini
tion. For example, it is often said that manufacturers are "strictly"
liable for all defects that leave their products in an unreasonably
dangerous state. When the alleged defect consists of a dangerous
design, however, the court must decide whether the design was so
bad as to produce an

unreasonably dangerous product, and the
manufacturer will be legally liable if (but only if) the product's de
sign falls short of the standard adopted by the court.60 This makes
the regime one of "negligence" rather than "strict liability" (accord
ing to the economic definition), for the defendant's liability de
pends on the social desirability of its product design choices. By
contrast, in strict liability regimes the defendant's liability may de
pend on how it behaved, but not on the social desirability of its
behavior.61
My purpose here is not to quibble with the economic defini
tions, which do serve a useful analytic purpose. Instead, my point is
simply that under the vast majority of legal standards - whatever
59. When a fraud claim rests on the defendant's failure to disclose information ade
quately, the court must also decide whether the undisclosed information would have been
"material" to a reasonable listener - in other words, whether the defendant's behavior went
far enough in disclosing all the information that might have been disclosed. Fleming James,
Jr. & Oscar S. Gray, Misrepresentation (pt. 2), 37 Mo. L. REv. 488, 497-502 (1978). The
analogous issues raised in public prosecutions for false advertising are discussed in Richard
Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U. L. REv. 657, 679·81, 696-714 (1985).
60. The same is true if the manufacturer's liability rests on an alleged failure to provide
users with an adequate warning of the product's risks (thus raising disclosure issues similar to
those raised by some claims of "fraud," discussed supra in note 59). For more complete
discussions of the relationship between "strict liability" and "negligence" in the products
liability context see, e.g., Sheila L. Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From
Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980); David
G. Owen, Defectiveness Restated: Exploding the "Strict" Products Liability Myth, 1996 U.
ILL. L. REv. 743.
61. For example, strict liability for ultrahazardous activities (such as dynamiting) attaches
only to defendants who engage in that activity, so even this liability is conditional on how the
defendant behaved. However, it is not conditional on any judgment about the social desira
bility of the relevant behavior - for example, there is no scrutiny of the desirability of a
defendant's decision to engage in dynamiting. This is what makes liability for ultrahazardous
activities a regime of "strict liability" even under the economic definition.
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label we use to characterize them - the probability of conviction

will be highly responsive to changes in a defendant's behavior.
Companies whose products impose only slight dangers, or dangers
only slightly in excess of their acknowledged benefits, are surely
more likely to escape liability than are manufacturers whose prod
ucts impose greater dangers. Similarly, sellers who disclose all of
the most important facts, and omit only a few arguably relevant
ones, are more likely to escape liability than are those who disclose
nothing whatsoever, omitting even those facts whose importance is
obvious. In short, these are all regimes in which the probability of a
conviction changes with improvements in a defendant's behavior,
and this is enough to generate the effects discussed earlier in this
article. (Of course, if the probability of detection and/or the
probability of filing suit are also responsive to changes in a defend
ants' behavior, these same effects will be present even in regimes of
true strict liability.)
D.

The Probability of Different Damage Awards

Finally, the legal doctrines governing the measurement of dam
ages can produce similar effects. Moreover, these effects may be
present whether the regime is based on negligence or on strict lia
bility. True, the measurement of damages will be irrelevant in any
system employing a constant fine, where (by definition) the penalty
does not depend on the damages in any particular case. Whenever
the penalty does depend on the damages in each case, however, the
rules for measuring damages can alter the deterrent effect.
The most relevant doctrines here are those that exclude certain
elements from the legally recoverable damages. Sometimes losses

are excluded if they were not reasonably foreseeable to the defend
ant,62 or

if

their amount could not be proven with an acceptable

degree of precision.63 Sometimes whole categories of losses may be
excluded, as with economic losses in some tort cases,64 or damages
for mental suffering and emotional distress in most breaches of con
tract.65

In still other cases, if the

defendant's behavior contributed

to the victim's harm in only a probabilistic way (by increasing the
62. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928); Hadley v. Baxendale,
9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
63. See 4 FmVLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF ToRTS § 25.3 (2d ed. 1986).
64.

See 4 id. § 25.18a.

65. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1979).
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risk of an injury), recovery may be disallowed under the rules gov
erning causation.66
Insofar as these exclusions reduce defendants' expected liability,
they will reduce the deterrent effect. Indeed, the need to make up
for such exclusions from "compensatory" damages has itself been
cited as one possible rationale for punitive awards.67 What is less
often noted, however, is that these exclusionary doctrines are often
applied in a way that makes them highly responsive to changes in a
defendant's underlying behavior. And this responsiveness creates
an offsetting effect that increases the law's deterrent effect, for all of
the reasons discussed earlier in this article.
For example, in cases where the defendant's conduct merely in
creased the risk of a probabilistic injury, it is often said that a de
fendant will be liable only if it is "more likely than not" that the
defendant's negligence actually caused the plaintiff's injury. In eco
nomic analyses, it is sometimes assumed that this rule makes de
fendants liable if their negligence increased the probability of an
injury by more than 50%.68 If such a 50% cutoff could be applied
perfectly, then defendants' expected liability would drop instanta
neously to zero once their behavior improved to the point where
their contribution to the risk fell below that threshold. In other
words, a perfectly applied 50% rule would produce effects very sim
ilar to those of the perfectly applied negligence standard discussed
earlier.69 But if there is instead any uncertainty in the application
of the 50% cutoff - for example, if defendants cannot know in
advance precisely how much of the probability a judge or jury will
ascribe to their particular behavior - then the expected punish
ment will fall more gradually, as defendants who improve their
behavior face an increasing likelihood that their behavior will be
66. See 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 63, § 20.2, at 93-101, 107-10. For economic analyses
of this rule, see William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Eco
nomic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109 (1983); Rosenberg, supra note 30; Steven Shavell,
Uncertainty over Causation and the Determination of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & EcoN. 587
(1985).
67. See, e.g., Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 3, at 768-69; Thomas C. Galligan, Jr.,
Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages, 51 LA. L. REv. 3, 39
(1990); see also Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 896 ("To the extent that [certain losses
are excluded from compensatory damages], an argument can be made that the level of dam
ages should be higher than that called for by our multiplier formula . . . ." (emphasis added)).
Polinsky and Shaven ultimately reco=end that these excluded losses not be used to justify
punitive awards, but only because the cost of measuring them will often be too high, and
because (when the cost is not too high) a superior solution would be to revise the rules so
that those losses were no longer excluded. See id. at 939-41.
68. See, e.g., Shaven, supra note 66, at 588.
69. See supra text accompanying note 52.
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found to fall below the relevant cutoff.70 In other words, defend
ants who improve their behavior are more likely t o be exonerated
on causal grounds from full responsibility for all of the losses they
may have caused.
More generally, defendant s who improve their behavior may
also be more likely to receive t he benefit of the doubt under most
of the other doctrines governing the measurement of da mages.

In

some cases, the cat egorical exclusion of certain kinds of damages
may be relaxed against defendants who behaved in a particularly
egregious way.71 In other cases, the responsiveness may come less
from an explicit legal rule and more from biases in t he application
of a vague legal standard, such as the requirement that losses be
proven with reasonable certainty,72 or that the l osses have been rea

sonably

foreseeable t o the defendant.73 D efe ndants who behaved

well may be more likely to get the benefit of the doubt from the
judge (or jury) in these matters, while defendants who behaved
badly may be treated more harshly.74
The reason this is important, of course, is that

if

a limit on the

recoverability of damages is applied in a way that itself responds to
changes in a defendant's behavior, this will increase the law's deter

rent effect. That is, even if the absolute level of damages is still less

than t he harm caused by the violation (because some losses are still
being excluded from t he measure of damages) , there can st ill be an
70. For cases suggesting that the actual rule is applied quite flexibly, see 4 HARPER ET
AL., supra note 63, § 20.2, at 93-101.
71. See, e.g., Dold v. Outrigger Hotel, 501 P.2d 368, 372 (Haw. 1972) (damages for emo
tional distress not normally recoverable for breach of contract, but held recoverable in tort if
the defendant breached "in a wanton or reckless manner"), overruled by Francis v. Lee
Enters., Inc., 971 P.2d 707 (Haw. 1999). For discussions of other similar doctrines, see
George M. Cohen, The Fault Lines in Contract Damages, 80 VA. L. REv. 1225 (1994); and
Patricia H. Marschall, Willfulness: A Crucial Factor in Choosing Remedies for Breach of Con
tract, 24 Aruz. L. REv. 733 (1982).
72. Harper, James, and Gray note an increasing liberality in allowing plaintiffs to recover
without proving their loss with literal certainty. They also report that "the tendency is great
est where the nature and impact of defendant's act is such as to make likely the kind of harm
that plaintiff is claiming, or to be especially offensive in light ofpublic policy considerations."
4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 63, § 25.3, at 510 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
73. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages
(pt. 1), 46 YALE LJ. 52, 85 (1936) ("As in the case of all 'reasonable man' standards, there is
an element of circularity about the test of foreseeability. 'For what items of damages should
the court hold the defaulting promisor? Those which he should as a reasonable man have
foreseen. But what should he have foreseen as a reasonable man? Those items of damages
for which the court feels he ought to pay."').
74. This aspect of legal bias was often noted by the legal realists. See, e.g., Ralph S.
Bauer, The Degree ofMoral Fault as Affecting Defendant's Liability, 81 U. PA. L. REv. 586
(1933); Fuller & Perdue, supra note 73, at 77. For more recent evidence consistent with this
view, see Stephan Landsman et al., Be Careful What You Wish For: The Paradoxical Effects
of Bifurcating Claims for Punitive Damages, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 297, 334-35.
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damages respond sufficiently to

in a defendant's behavior. Here, too, it is the rate of

change in the expected liability, rather than the absolute level of
liability, that matters for deterrence.

An example will serve to illustrate.

In the toxic waste scenario,
$6 million in
taken, and $5 million if the

we originally assumed that each leak would cause
damages

if no

extra precautions were

precautions were taken. Suppose now that many of these damages
are difficult to measure, or are difficult to attribute to any particular
defendant. But suppose, too, that more of these losses will be at

tributed to defendants who did not take any extra precautions than
to defendants who did take precautions, simply because the former
are less likely to get the benefit of any doubt. For concreteness,
suppose that defendants who did not take the precautions will be
assessed

$5 million in damages each time they are caught (as com
$6 million in damages their activity actually caused),

pared to the

while defendants who did take precautions will be charged with
only

$1 million in damages (as compared to the $5 million they ac
tually caused). In other words, suppose that both types of defend
ants get away with paying less than the full social costs of their
behavior, but that this shortfall is greatest for defendants who took
the extra precautions.

In such a

case, even

if the probability of punishment is 25% for

both defendants (and thus is completely unresponsive to changes in
their behavior), defendants will still have an incentive to take the
optimal level of care. It might seem as though their incentives in
this case would have to favor underdeterrence, since neither de
fendant is being charged with the full social costs of its behavior,
and since both defendants are discounting these already-low penal
ties by the same

25% probability of punishment.

However, in this

example defendants who do not take the extra precautions will face
an expected liability of

$12,500 (.01

x

.25

x

$5,000,000),

while de

fendants who do take the precautions will see their expected liabil
ity fall to

$2,500 (.01

x

.25

x

$1,000,000).
$10,000

precautions can save defendants

($12,500 - $2,500), which just equals the

This means that the
in expected liability

social value of the precau

tions and thus achieves optimal deterrence.
The lesson here is the same as it was in preceding subsections of
this article. That is, it is not simply the absolute level of expected
liability that matters, but rather the

rate at which that expected lia

bility declines with improvements in a defendant's behavior. It will
be relatively rare for that decline to come from changes in the mere
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probability of detection, but it should be quite common - the rule,
rather than the exception - for improvements in a defendant's
behavior to reduce the probability of prosecution, the probability of
conviction, and/or the likely damage award. Declines in any of
these factors will

cause

a

divergence

between

the

optimal

case-by-case multiplier and the optimal constant multiplier (or the
optimal constant fine). As a result, satisfaction of the traditional
multiplier principle will be sufficient but not necessary for optimal
deterrence - and this conclusion, too, should be considered the
rule rather than the exception.
CHOOSING AMONG THE ALTERNATIVES

IV.

We are now in a position to compare the strengths and weak
nesses of case-by-case multipliers, constant multipliers, and the
other alternative penalty systems discussed above. While any of
these systems could, in theory, lead to optimal levels of deterrence,
they differ in many other respects that could make them more or
less desirable.

In this final Part of the article, I consider differences

based on their relative ease of administration; their effect on other
economically relevant variables, such as the level of overall activity
or the optimal allocation of risk; and their possible symbolic or ex
pressive effects.
A.

Ease of Calculation

One virtue of the traditional multiplier principle is that it is con
ceptually simple and, therefore, easy to explain to a judge or jury.
The case-by-case multiplier requires only two pieces of information:
the actual harm caused by the defendant's behavior, and the actual
probability of punishment that the defendant faced. And while it

will rarely be possible to measure either of these elements precisely,
in many cases it should be possible to come to a rough estimate.75
Moreover, all that really matters under this approach is that the
average or

expected penalty

equal the actual harm divided by the

probability of punishment, so it may not even matter
long

as their

errors

if juries

are not systematically biased

err as

in either

direction.76
By contrast, many of the alternative remedies are more difficult
to calculate. For example, to determine the optimal constant multi75. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 891-93. For somewhat more skeptical views,
based on the psychology of jury decision-making, see Sunstein et al., supra note 4, at 2111-12;
Viscusi, supra note 4, at 327-32.
76. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 892.
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plier, the decisionmaker must know several factors in addition to
the actual harm caused by the defendant's behavior and the actual
probability of punishment.

In

addition, the decisionmaker must be

able to estimate the actual harm that would have been present, and
the probability of punishment the defendant would have faced, if
the defendant had instead committed a slightly more or slightly less
serious violation.

In particular, the

decisionmaker must be able to

measure each set of factors with sufficient precision to estimate the

difference between the two violations, in order to calculate the rate
of change in the relevant variables. Finally, once these estimates
have been made, they must then be combined through a formula
that is more complicated than simply multiplying by one over the
probability of punishment.77 Thus, the optimal constant multiplier
will always be harder to calculate than the optimal case-by-case
multiplier.
The same objection can be raised against many of the other al
ternatives discussed above. For e�ample, calculating the optimal
constant to add or subtract from a compensatory award, or the opti
mal amount by which to adjust the substantive legal standard, is just
as complex as calculating the optimal constant multiplier.78 Calcu
lating the optimal constant fine is slightly simpler conceptually, for
this requires knowledge of only (a) the rate at which the probability
of punishment changes in response to changes in defendants'
behavior, and (b) the rate at which the expected social costs change
in response to changes in defendants' behavior.79 But information
about these hypothetical rates of change will often be hard to come
by, compared to information about the actual social harm and the
actual probability of punishment. As a result, the case-by-case mul
tiplier will surely rank highest in ease of calculation.
77. If x represents the defendant's level of precautions, H(x) represents the expected
social harm at any particular level of precautions, and P(x) represents the probability of
punishment at any particular level of precautions, then the optimal case-by-case multiplier is
given by a simple fraction: 1/P(x). To calculate the optimal constant multiplier, we need to
let x* represent the socially optimal level of precautions, and H'(x*) and P'(x*) represent the
rate at which the social harm and the probability of punishment change with slight deviations
from the optimal level of precautions. The optimal constant multiplier can then be written as
the following complex formula:
H'(x*)
H'(x*) P(x*) + H(x*) P'(x*)
See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13, at 294. Obviously, this complex formula would be
more difficult to present to a judge or jury.
78. See Polinsky & Rubinfeld, supra note 40, at 159-60, app.
79. Using the notation introduced supra in note 77, the optimal constant fine can be rep
resented by the simple fraction H'(x*)IP'(x*). See Craswell & Calfee, supra note 13, at 297.
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Institutional Responsibility

Another difference is that a case-by-case multiplier, by its very
nature, must be calculated separately for each defendant, so all the
calculations must be made by a judge or jury. By contrast, a con
stant multiplier could be set once by a legislature or administrative
agency, leaving judges and juries with only the task (in each individ
ual case) of measuring the losses to which the constant multiplier

would be applied. If a constant fine were used, the judge or jury
would not even need to calculate the actual losses in each case, thus
shifting even more of the work to a centralized body.

The ability to make such calculations centrally could be an ad
vantage. Obviously, it is sometimes cheaper to have calculations

made once by a centralized body, rather than making them anew in
every case. A centralized body may also be able to assemble more

expertise than a judge or a jury - for example, it could commission
statistical studies of the probability of punishment and the rate at

which it changes. A centralized body can also benefit from the abil
ity to "fine tune" a constant multiplier or a constant fine (or an

adjustment to the substantive legal standard), raising or lowering it

until the desired level of deterrence is achieved. Finally, in some
contexts (or from some perspectives) a centralized body might be
seen as more "democratic" or politically accountable.

On the other hand, there are also drawbacks to a centralized

decision process, which may make these advantages moot. A cen

tralized body may be more prone to political "capture" by groups

favorable to plaintiffs or defendants.80 Also, even a well-motivated
central body must face the practical problem of defining, in ad

vance, the exact class of cases to which any particular fine or multi
plier would be applied. After all, the constant multiplier that is

optimal for malpractice cases is unlikely to be the safi?.e as the one

that is optimal for products liability cases; it may also be different

for some malpractice cases than for others. Thus, any centralized

solution must either (a) define a separate penalty for many differ
ent categories of cases, with the attendant difficulty of defining the

boundaries of each; or (b) rely on a smaller number of relatively

crude categories, recognizing that the penalty selected for each
category will not be ideal for every case within that category.
By contrast, one advantage of a decentralized system is that it is

unnecessary to define such categories in advance. As Polinsky and
80. Tue legislatively enacted caps on punitive damage awards, discussed supra in the text
following note 41, may be an example of this.
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Shaven pointed out in their analysis of the case-by-case multiplier,
courts can estimate the probability of punishment facing any partic
u1ar defendant without having to assign that defendant to some a
priori category: they can define that probability based on whatever
is known about this individual defendant's characteristics.81 To be
sure, this does not mean that judges or juries will necessarily get the
probability right, for (as the preceding subsection discussed) even
case-by-case calcu1ations cannot be based on anything more than a
rough estimate of the relevant variables. But since judges and ju
ries decide cases after the fact, they will at least be spared the cost
of trying to define relevant categories

in advance,

which is an una

voidable cost of any centralized calcu1ation.

In short,

there may be cases where the appropriate penalty can

best be calcu1ated centrally, and in those cases the traditional
case-by-case mu1tiplier will be inferior (insofar as ease of calcula
tion is concerned).

In many

cases, though, the costs of centraliza

tion will be too high, so both the case-by-case multiplier and the
possible alternatives will have to be estimated in every case by indi
vidual judges or juries.

In

that event, the advantage in terms of

ease of calcu1ation will usually rest with the traditional case-by-case
mu1tiplier, for the reasons discussed in the preceding subsection.

C.

Optimal Levels of Activity

In addition, whenever it is important to optimize defendants'
levels of activity, the case-by-case mu1tiplier may well be superior.
As Steven Shaven first emphasized, many social costs can be re
duced by carrying on an activity more carefully

or by reducing the

frequency of the activity itself.82 For example, drivers can reduce
the number of auto accidents by driving more carefully, but they
can also reduce the number of accidents by using their cars less fre81. See Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 3, at 893. More precisely, the probability can be
estimated based on (1) all facts that were known to the defendant at the time it chose its level
of care, together with (2) any other facts that did not become known until later, but only if
those facts were just as likely to raise the probability as to lower it. The qualification is
important because it would not be correct, under the traditional multiplier principle, to calcu
late the probability of punishment for a narrow category defined as "all defendants who
behaved in the following way and who happened to leave evidence that allowed their victim
to bring suit and prevail at trial." The probability of punishment for defendants who are
defined in this way is, of course, exactly one, so calculating the multiplier on this basis would
be the same as employing no multiplier at all.
For a more general discussion of the choice between categorical and individualized judg
ments, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE L.J. 557
{1992).
82. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL Sruo. 1, 2-3 (1980).
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quently. Thus, optimizing the level of activity can also be a legiti
mate goal of deterrence policy.
Significantly, negligence regimes often do not give defendants
any direct incentive to constrain their levels of activity. Negligence
regimes can easily condition liability on whether a driver was exer
cising appropriate care, and this gives drivers an incentive to choose
their care appropriately. But such regimes rarely condition liability
on whether a defendant drove with unnecessary frequency (proba
bly because of the difficulty of determining a "reasonable" fre
quency), so they give drivers no incentive to limit their total amount
of driving.

In terms of the analysis used in this article, the

probability of being held liable (for any given accident) usually is
not responsive at all to any change in the number of miles the de
fendant drove.
If enforcement is perfect, strict liability regimes can improve de

fendants' incentives to adjust their levels of activity.

In

theory,

strict liability forces defendants to internalize all of the social costs
caused by their activity, and thus gives them an incentive to think
about

every

way of reducing those costs, including engaging in the

activity less frequently.83 Even under a regime of strict liability,
however, imperfect enforcement will dilute a defendant's incen
tives. That is,

if

a driver (or a firm employing a fleet of drivers)

should be liable for every accident that results, but

25%

if there is only a

chance that any given accident will lead to a successful suit,

the firm's liability will reflect only 25% of the costs its activity im
poses, thus giving it too weak an incentive to reduce its amount of
driving.

In

such a case, the traditional multiplier can restore the

optimal incentives by multiplying the firm's expected liability by
four, thus making the firm again bear the full social costs of its driv
ing activity.

It might seem, then, that whenever the level of the defendant's
activity can affect social costs, the traditional multiplier would al
ways be the better way of achieving optimal deterrence. However,
this conclusion is subject to three important limitations. First, the
traditional multiplier only produces this effect in regimes of "strict
liability," as that term was defined earlier.84

In

"negligence" re

gimes, defendants will still escape responsibility for the social costs
of their activities whenever they are found to have complied with
the legal standard, so even a traditional multiplier will not optimize
83. See id.
84. See supra text accompanying note 56.
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levels of activity. And since most legal regimes really are "negli
gence" regimes (under the definition used here), this argument for
the traditional multiplier is of limited applicability.
Second, even under regimes of "strict liability," there are a few
cases in which increases in the level of activity could increase the
probability of punishment per violation. For example,

if

one of a

company's trucks is detected leaking toxic chemicals, the authori
ties may then decide to inspect all the other trucks owned by that
firm. If so, the per-violation probability of punishment will indeed
respond to changes in the overall quantity of driving, because
increased driving brings a greater probability that at least one of the
firm's trucks will be detected leaking chemicals, thus triggering an
inspection of all the trucks. While this form of interdependence is
probably not very common, it sometimes occurs in the investigation
of criminal activities (tax fraud, racketeering, drug rings, etc.),
where detection of one offense triggers close investigation of all of a
defendant's activities.
Third, even when the traditional multiplier is superior in its ef
fect on levels of activity, it may give rise to other problems that
outweigh this benefit. After all, the level of activity is only one of
the dimensions of social cost with which the law should be con
cerned. As the remaining subsections will discuss, there are other
dimensions along which a case-by-case multiplier might sometimes
be inferior to the alternative routes to optimal deterrence.
D.

Optimal Levels of Risk

As noted earlier, the optimal case-by-case multiplier will typi
cally be greater than (and will never be any less than) the optimal
constant multiplier. This could make the case-by-case multiplier
inferior from the standpoint of optimal levels of risk, quite indepen
dently of any effect the multiplier might have on levels of deter
rence. If either defendants or their victims are risk averse, there
will be benefits from keeping the total amount of risk in the system
at a minimum. In a world of imperfect enforcement, however, a
case-by-case multiplier increases the risk in the system because it
presents defendants with the risk of paying even larger penalties.
This could be a drawback in either of two situations.
First, as Polinsky and Shavell have noted, the effect on risk is a

drawback if defendants are risk averse and full insurance is unavail-
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able.85 If defendants are risk averse, a

$20 million in damages

25% chance of having to pay

(as the traditional multiplier would recom

mend) will press on them more than four times as heavily as a
chance of having to pay only

$5

25%

million. The larger award thus

could produce too much of a deterrent effect; and the larger award
could also reduce total welfare directly, by forcing defendants to
bear the disutility of this increased risk. However, the significance
of these drawbacks are limited by the fact that they apply only to
defendants who are risk averse, and even then only

if they

cannot

get liability insurance (which would transfer the risk to a risk neu
tral insurance company). Most damage awards are legally insura
ble.86 Even when they are not, many defendants are publicly held
corporations who can usually be presumed to be risk neutral, or
capable of self insurance through diversification of their sharehold
ers' portfolios.87
Even when insurance is readily available, however, the effect on
risk may still be a drawback

if victims are risk averse, at least when

the defendant and its victims stand in a market relationship (such as
seller-customer or employer-employee). To be sure, there is some
times no need for any liability at all when the defendant and its
victims stand in a market relationship,

if

the victims are well

informed about the risks and so the defendant will have adequate
market incentives to improve its behavior.88

In

some markets,

though, potential victims may not be quite so well-informed, in
which case market incentives alone may be inadequate for optimal
deterrence. This, at least, is the standard argument for any form of
liability for deterrence purposes when defendants and their victims
stand in a market relationship.89 And

if the

enforcement of such

liability is imperfect, the same arguments that would call for a dam85. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 3, at 886-87. For more technical economic analy
ses, see Louis A. Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for Acts That
Definitely Are Undesirable, 12 INTI.. REv. L. & EcoN. 3, 6-8 (1992); A. Mitchell Polinsky &
Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines, 69
AM. EcoN. REv. 880, 884-85 (1979); Steven Shavell, On Liability and Insurance, 13 BELL J.
EcoN. 120, 124-26 (1982).
86. Even punitive damage awards are insurable in some states. See Polinsky & Shavell,
supra note 3, at 931 n.193.
87. See id. at 887 n.44. Obviously, this conclusion would not apply to the extent that the
risk in question was systematic (e.g., the risk of a change in legal rules that would increase the
expected liability of all corporations).
88. See id. at 935-36.
89. For formal economic models, see, e.g., Shavell, supra note 82, at 14-17; Michael
Spence, Consumer Misperceptions, Product Failure and Producer Liability, 44 REv. EcoN.
STUD. 561 (1977).
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age multiplier in other contexts would appear to call for a multiplier
in market relationships as well.90
The important point about market relationships, though, is that
defendants' expected liability will ultimately have to be borne by
consumers in the form of higher prices.91 For example, if product
defects cause

$5 million in damages but defendants are held liable
25% of the time, a premium will have to be added to the prod
uct's price to cover the defendant's expected liability of $1.25 mil
lion (.25 x $5,000,000) . If the legal system then adopts the
traditional case-by-case multiplier, thus making defendants pay $20
million every time they are caught (4 x $5,000,000), their expected
liability will rise to $5 million (.25 x 4 x $5,000,000), so the price
premium will have to be four times as large. In other words, the
only

good news is that those consumers who are lucky enough to bring a
successful lawsuit will have their recovery increased by a factor of
four, but the bad news is that all consumers will have to pay an up
front price that includes a premium that is four times as large. In
effect, the introduction of a multiplier turns the liability component
of the price into a lottery ticket, with a bigger price up front sup
porting the chance of a bigger payoff at the end.
If customers are risk neutral, they will be indifferent toward this

lottery; and if they are risk-preferring then they might actually like
this sort of a gamble. It is more plausible, though, to assume that
customers are risk averse, at least with respect to this sort of contin
gency. Those who would like some additional gamble can always
go to the race track or play the state lottery, and it would be odd to
posit a taste for gambling that could only be satisfied by wagering
on a particular product defect. For most customers, then, the intro
duction of this extra lottery element will make the product less
attractive, causing an additional welfare loss.92
Moreover, this effect (unlike the effect on risk averse

defend

will not disappear with the purchase of insurance. While full
insurance can protect parties from many forms of risk, in this con
text consumers could be protected only by purchasing "reverse"
insurance of a sort that is rarely available. That is, consumers

ants)

90. Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 3, at 935; see also id. at 938 (making the same argu
ment for punitive damages in breach of contract cases). Breach of contract cases, by defini·
tion, always involve defendants and victims who were in a market relationship.
91. For a review of the literature on this point, see Richard Craswell, Passing On the
Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 361 (1991).
92. I develop this point at more length in Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Mar
ket Relationships, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1994).
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would need a policy in which the insurance company paid the con
sumer up front (rather than the consumer paying an insurance pre
mium), in return for which the consumer would assign to the
insurance company his or her right to the punitive portion of any
damage award.

In

theory, the up-front payment by the insurance

company would exactly compensate the consumer for that part of
the higher product price that reflected the punitive portion of the
defendant's expected liability. Such a policy would thus have the
same effect as restoring consumers to the premultiplier regime, in
which they paid a lower price and were limited to compensatory
damages

if

they sued. But since this sort of reverse insurance is

rarely available, most consumers will have no way to insulate them
selves from the risk-increasing effect of the larger, case-by-case
multiplier.93
Of course, even when this risk-increasing effect is a drawback,
that may not be sufficient reason to reject the traditional multiplier.
If damage multipliers are used only rarely, the effect on total risk
bearing costs is not likely to be very large.94 Moreover, the effect
on risk averse parties is only one of the relevant consequences the
law must consider, and a slight negative effect on risk averse con
sumers might be outweighed by greater improvements in (say) the
ease of administration, or the effects on defendants' levels of activ
ity. My point here is simply that

all of these effects must be consid

ered before any overall decision is reached - and that in
evaluating this totality of effects, the effect on risk averse consum
ers will usually count as a negative.
E.

Practical Constraints on the Maximum Penalty

The traditional, case-by-case multiplier may also be less desira
ble

if defendants have limited assets, and would be unable to pay a

fine as high as that required by the multiplier principle. This con
straint is particularly likely to be a problem when the probability of
punishment is small, so the penalty required under a case-by-case
multiplier would be large. For example,

if a violation causes $5 mil-

93. One possible way of providing such insurance might be a market in which consumers
could sell their right to recovery in advance, at the same time they purchased the product.
For a discussion of how this market might work, see Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in
Unmatured Tort Claims, 75 VA. L. REv. 383 (1989). As Cooter points out, though, these
transactions are illegal under current law. See id. at 383 & n.1.
94. For empirical evidence consistent with this view, at least where punitive damages are
concerned, see Jonathan M. Karpoff & John R. Lott, Jr., Punitive Damages: Their Determi
nants, Effects on Firm Value, and the Impact ofSupreme Court and Congressional Attempts to
Limit Awards, 52 J.L. & EcoN. (forthcoming 1999).
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lion worth of damages but brings only a 25% probability of punish
ment, the optimal case-by-case multiplier would require a fine of
$20 million (4 x $5,000,000). But if many defendants are thinly
capitalized firms, the threat of an $20 million penalty may have no
more effect than the threat of a $9 or $10 million penalty, if $9 or
$10 million is the most they could possibly pay. Indeed, in some
cases the adoption of larger penalties could even reduce deterrence,
by giving potential defendants an incentive to operate with even
less capital than they otherwise might. This would make it even
more likely that these defendants would not have to pay the full
legal penalty (because they would not have enough money to pay
it), and so would further reduce the law's deterrent effect.95
One possible solution to this problem is to (1) raise the penalty
as high as possible, then (2) make up for any remaining underdeter
rence by improving the enforcement system to raise the probability
of punishment.96 In the above example, if the maximum fine that
could possibly be collected is only $10 million, optimal incentives
could still be achieved if the enforcement system were improved to
raise the probability of punishment from 25% to 50%, since that
would make the expected penalty equal the expected social harm
(.50 x $10,000,000 = $5,000,000). However, improving the enforce
ment system has costs of its own that must also be taken into ac
count. As a result, this solution usually leads to a compromise in
which the probability of punishment is raised to some extent (at
some cost), but it is not raised high enough to satisfy the multiplier
principle.97
What is less often noted, though, is that the alternative routes to
optimal deterrence may provide another solution to this problem.
As we have seen, alternatives such as a constant multiplier or a con
stant fine typically require smaller penalties than those required by
the case-by-case multiplier. As a result, the fines or damage awards
required under these alternatives are less likely to run up against
95. For an economic model of this effect, see James Boyd & Daniel E. Ingberman, Do
Punitive Damages Promote Deterrence?, 19 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 47 {1999). For an analysis
of the effect of limited capital on deterrence generally, see S. Shaven, The Judgment-Proof
Problem, 6 INTL. REv. L. & EcoN. 45 {1986).
96. Polinsky & Shaven, supra note 3, allude to this possibility at 922 n.167.
97. For mathematical analyses of these trade-offs, see A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven
Shaven, A Note on Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals, 81 AM. EcoN.
REv. 618 (1991); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shaven, supra note 85, 69 AM. EcoN. REv.
883 (1979); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shaven, The Optimal Use of Fines and Imprison
ment, 24 J. PuB. EcoN. 89 (1984) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shaven, Fines and Imprisonment].
As the second of these articles indicates, another possible solution to the problem of defend
ants with limited assets - albeit a solution with costs of its own - is to resort to nonmone
tary sanctions such as imprisonment. See Polinsky & Shaven, Fines and Imprisonment, supra.
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the constraints imposed by defendants' limited assets. Where lim
ited assets are a problem, then, these alternatives may actually be
superior to the traditional multiplier.
Moreover, there are other factors besides limited assets that
may constrain the maximum penalty. Jurors (even judges or prose
cutors) are sometimes reluctant to impose penalties that seem "too
large," thus constraining the maximum penalty through jury nullifi
cation (or through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion).98

if the maxi
In particular,

Whenever this is likely, the effect will be the same as
mum penalty were constrained for any other reason.

if

this constraint is below the size of the penalty required by the

multiplier principle, the case-by-case multiplier will lead to un
derdeterrence. Here, too, there may be an advantage to one of the
alternatives that can achieve optimal deterrence with smaller
penalties.
F.

Litigation Costs

Because of their smaller size, the alternatives to the traditional
multiplier may also reduce the amount spent on litigation in any
particular case.99 This is so for two reasons: the total stakes will be
lower, and not as much will tum on establishing any particular
probability of punishment.
First, a traditional multiplier raises the stakes involved in litigat
ing other issues, such as the amount of damages to which the multi
plier will be applied (or the underlying issue of liability itself).
Under a system with no multiplier at all, defendants obviously will
have some incentive to try to convince the court that their behavior
did not do very much harm, or that they should not be found liable
at all. But

if

case-by-case multipliers are used, every reduction in

the measure of damages will be three times as valuable to the de
fendant if the multiplier is three, or five times or ten times as valua
ble

(if

the multiplier is five or ten). To be sure, the measure of

damages and the question of underlying liability will also take on
greater importance under any regime using a constant multiplier, as
long as that multiplier is greater than one. But since the optimal
constant multiplier will almost always be less than the optimal
98. An economic model with some of these features - specifically, a model in which
finders of fact implicitly raise the burden of proof when higher sanctions are sought - is
presented in James Andreoni, Reasonable Doubt and the Optimal Magnitude of Fines:
Should the Punishment Fit the Crime?, 22 RAND J. EcoN. 385 (1991).
99. The effect on total litigation costs, by increasing or decreasing the number of suits that
are filed, was discussed in supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
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case-by-case multiplier, the incentive to spend on litigation should
at least be lower if a constant multiplier is used (and similarly for a
constant fine, or for an adjustment to the substantive standard with
no adjustment in liability).
Second, a case-by-case multiplier also gives parties an incentive
to spend money litigating the size of the multiplier itself. Consider,
for example, a defendant who caused $5 million worth of damages,
and for whom the probability of punishment was somewhere
around 20%. H the court finds that the probability of punishment
was exactly 20%, the case-by-case multiplier will be set at five and
the defendant will have to pay $25 million in damages (5 x
$5,000,000). But if the defendant persuades the court that the
probability of punishment was really 25% , the case-by-case multi
plier will then be set at four, and the damage award will be reduced
to $20 million (4 x $5,000,000). In other words, the defendant can
save $5 million in liability ($25,000,000 - $20,000,000) just by alter
ing the court's perception of the probability by five percentage
points. This is the same as the amount the defendant could gain by
establishing that it was not liable at all, thus reducing its liability
from $5,000,000 to 0, in a regime that did not use any multipliers.
For many litigants, then, it will pay to spend just as much litigating
the probability of punishment (in a system with case-by-case multi
pliers) as they would spend contesting liability itself (in a system
with purely compensatory damages).
Of course, if there is a chance they could alter the court's find
ing on probability even more - say, by raising it from 20% to 33%,
thus reducing the multiplier from five to three - they will have an
incentive to spend even more. By contrast, this incentive will be
eliminated in any system employing a constant multiplier or a con
stant fine. For all of these reasons, then, the amount spent litigating
each case should be significantly higher under the traditional
case-by-case multiplier.
G.

Symbolic or Expressive Effects

Finally, the alternatives to the case-by-case multiplier may also
have symbolic or expressive advantages. Recall that, when the
probability of punishment declines with improvements in a defend
ant's behavior (as it usually will), the case-by-case multiplier has to
be largest for those defendants who behaved relatively well (to
make up for their low probability of punishment), and smallest for
defendants who behaved relatively badly. For instance, in one of
the examples discussed earlier, defendants who took extra precau-
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tions s·aw their probability of punishment fall from

25%

to

10%,

thus increasing the case-by-case multiplier from four to ten.100 The
actual damages in that example were
precautions

and

$5

million

with

$6

million without the extra
precautions. With a

the

case-by-case multiplier, however, defendants who took the extra
precautions had to pay $50 million every time they were caught (10
x $5,000,000), while defendants who did not take the precautions
had to pay only

$24 million (4

x

$6,000,000).

A possible objection is that this inverts the "fair" or "just" rela

tion between wrongfulness of behavior and severity of punishment,
by punishing those who behave well more harshly than those who
behave badly. The objection is not that this will distort such parties'
incentives, because incentives depend on the expected levels of pun
ishment, and the expected punishment is more severe for defend
ants who do not take precautions
than for defendants who do

(.10

(.25 x 4 x $6,000,000 = $6,000,000)
x 10 x $5,000,000 = $5,000,000).

But it is sometimes argued that justice places independent con
straints on the penalties that can be meted out by the state independent, that is, of any utilitarian or deterrence-related goals
- and that the regime described here would run afoul of those con
straints.101 Indeed, the Supreme Court has suggested (though with
out addressing this precise issue) that some proportionality between
the size of the penalty and the wrongfulness of the defendant's con
duct may even be constitutionally required.102
Moreover, even those who object to deontological constraints
on the size of the permissible penalties might still worry that bad
consequences would follow from a regime that punished mild
offenses more severely than egregious ones. It is sometimes said
that one function of law is to educate its citizens and to instill ap

propriate attitudes concerning right and wrong.103 Presumably, this

expressive or educative function includes expressing appropriate at100. See supra text following note 14.
101. Cf. !MMANuEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE 100 (John Ladd
trans., Bobbs-Merril Co. 1965) (1916) ("The law concerning punishment is a categorical im
perative, and woe to him who rummages around in the winding paths of a theory of happi
ness [i.e., utility] looking for some advantage to be gained. . . . ). For modem discussions of
this position, describing in more detail its conflict with the multiplier principle, see Chapman
& Trebilcock, supra note 3, at 779-98; Alan H. Goldman, The Paradox of Punishment, 9 PHIL.
& Pus. A.FF. 42 (1979).
102. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575-76, 580-81 (1996).
103. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453,
472-73 (1997). For further development of this idea in connection with punitive damages, see
Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42
AM. U. L. REv. 1393, 1430-40 (1993).
"
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titudes about relative degrees of wrongfulness. But the regime de
scribed above could send the wrong signal in this regard, as it could
suggest that defendants who took the extra precautions (and there
fore had to pay $50 million) had behaved worse than the defend
ants who did not take the extra precautions (and who only had to
pay $24 million).104 If citizens' attitudes are shaped by this incor
rect signal, that could affect the citizens' willingness to reduce their
own pollution (or even their willingness to comply with laws in gen
eral), thus raising the cost of achieving any given level of
deterrence.
To be sure, each of these arguments has difficulties of its own. It
is controversial (to say the least) whether we ought to accept purely
deontological constraints on the size of permissible punishments.
Moreover, the argument that inverted penalties will send the wrong
moral message depends on a kind of misperception on the part of
the audience of the signal. That is, if citizens realized that the re
gime described above was adopted solely for its deterrent virtues,
and that the difference in penalties therefore expressed only the
fact that the probability of punishment was different for the two
defendants, there would then be no reason for citizens to draw an
incorrect moral lesson. Indeed, if citizens realized that the expected
penalty was actually harsher for defendants who did not take extra
precautions, they might continue to draw the correct moral lesson,
in which case the law's expressive or educative effect would be rein
forced. The concern that citizens will draw the wrong moral lesson
thus rests on an implicit assumption of "noise" or miscommunica
tion between the message intended by the drafters of the policy and
the message understood by the citizenry. And while such errors or
misperceptions are no doubt common, it is notoriously difficult to
predict the exact form they will take.
Still, the fact that such misperceptions are possible means that
this concern cannot be dismissed out of hand. My only point here is
that, to the extent this danger is real, it too can be avoided by using
one of the alternatives to the traditional multiplier principle. Since
these alternatives all allow the actual penalties (not just the ex
pected penalties) to increase in severity with the egregiousness of
the defendant's behavior, they would not pose any risk of the moral
misperception at issue here.

104. This very objection is made by Galanter & Luban, supra note 103, at 1449-50.
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V.

CONCLUSIONS

As we have seen, the traditional multiplier of one over the
probability of punishment can achieve optimal deterrence

if

it is

recalculated on a case-by-case basis, to reflect the probability of
punishment facing each individual defendant. Moreover,

if it is ap

plied in this way, the traditional multiplier will be optimal in a wide
variety of circumstances, regardless of whether the premultiplier
incentives favored under- or overdeterrence. Because a case-by
case multiplier can achieve optimal deterrence using a relatively
simple formula under so broad a range of conditions, it is perhaps
not surprising that the law review literature has focused almost ex
clusively on this method of correcting for imperfect enforcement.
In fact, though, the law uses a variety of other methods that do
not fit the traditional multiplier principle. Sometimes the law uses a
constant multiplier; sometimes it uses constant fines; and sometimes
it uses adjustments to the substantive legal standard. Indeed, while
all of these methods are relatively common, it is very difficult to
find examples of a true case-by-case multiplier, in which defendants
whose conduct faces a high probability of punishment are "re
warded" with a multiplier lower than that given to defendants
whose conduct is less likely to be punished. Unfortunately, the
legal literature has focused so much on the case-by-case multiplier
principle that it has not even begun to address the pros and cons of
these alternative (and much more common) systems of deterrence.
This article is an attempt to begin to fill that gap. While its conclu
sions are necessarily tentative, several points can be made.
First, the traditional analysis is still perfectly valid whenever the
probability of punishment is essentially unresponsive to changes in
a defendant's behavior. This is most likely to be the case when the
probability of punishment depends entirely on whether the defend
ant's offense is detected. In other words, the traditional analysis is
strongest

if,

once the offense is detected, prosecution and convic

tion (or litigation and civil liability) are virtually sure to follow. If,
in addition, the probability of detection depends purely on chance,
rather than on a prosecutorial decision to allocate more resources
to detecting serious offenses; and

if

any rules excluding certain

losses from the fine or damage award are applied no more harshly
against defendants who behaved badly than against defendants who
behaved well, the expected punishment will then be completely in
dependent of any improvements in a defendant's behavior. In such
a case, there will be no difference between the optimal case-by-case
multiplier and the optimal constant multiplier (or the optimal con-
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stant fine), and all of them will have to satisfy the traditional multi
plier principle.

In

all other cases, however, the probability of punishment will

respond to improvements in defendants' behavior.

In these

cases,

as we have seen, satisfaction of the multiplier principle will no
longer be necessary for optimal deterrence (though it may still be
sufficient). For example, the optimal constant multiplier will gener
ally be less than the level called for by the multiplier principle, per
haps even at or below compensatory levels. The optimal fine, too,
could also be less than the traditional multiplier principle, though in
some cases it could be greater. Moreover, if adjustments to the sub
stantive legal standard are also employed, the optimal fine or dam
age award could be even less. On the other hand,

if the substantive

standard is relaxed considerably, to the point where a defendant
who behaves optimally faces no risk whatsoever of being found in
violation of the standard, the penalties for those found in violation
could then be substantially

raised without interfering with

optimal

deterrence.

In

any of these cases, the law faces a choice about which strat

egy to use to achieve optimal deterrence. This is the choice whose
investigation I have tried to begin. Preliminarily, I can suggest that
the case-by-case multiplier will work best whenever it is extremely
important to optimize defendants' levels of activity as well as their
levels of care, and/or

if it is

more efficient to have all the calcula

tions needed for deterrence made anew by a judge or jury in each
individual case. On the other hand, one of the other strategies will
probably be best

if

it is more efficient to have these calculations

made by a central legislative or administrative body, and/or

if there

are practical constraints on the maximum penalty the law can
assess, thus requiring penalties below the traditional multiplier.
One of the alternative strategies may also be best if it is important
to preserve a direct relationship between the harmfulness of a de
fendant's conduct and the size of the actual penalty that is imposed,
either because such proportionality is constitutionally required, or
because it is desirable in order to send the proper symbolic
message.
I have stressed that these conclusions are tentative, and doubt
less they could be improved or refined through further analysis.
Until we recognize that there is a choice to be made, however, no
progress on these issues will even be possible. It is time to recog
nize that the multiplier principle is sufficient but not necessary for
optimal deterrence.

